Seventy-Eighth "Lightning" Division. n.p., 1946. 101 p. #603-310.1946. U.S. Army. 310th Inf Regt.

Prologue to Combat

The Third Battalion of the 310th Infantry Regiment, 78th Infantry Division was activated on the 15 August 1942 and began its training at Camp, Butner, N. C. This training consisted of general Infantry subjects such as tactics, weapons firing, infiltration, village fighting, bayonet training, hand to hand combat, and, lest we forget, long tiresome hikes. On the 15 November 1943 the Third Battalion moved to the Carolina Maneuver Area in South Carolina. After two weeks 'of rugged maneuvering the battalion returned on the 7 December 1943 to Camp Butner. At this time equipment was checked and new equipment issued in preparation for the Tennessee Maneuvers. While the battalion was preparing for the coming maneuvers, a POR shipment altered the course of events in the 78th Division. Men were picked from the different companies and placed on the overseas replacement shipment list. On the 2 January 1944 these men departed for Fort Meade, Maryland and from this camp were shipped to combat theaters in various parts of the world. On 20 January 1944 the battalion moved, to the Tennessee Maneuver Area where they maneuvered against the 17th Airborne Division and the 106th Infantry Division. After six weeks of thorough training, with little rest the battalion returned to Camp Pickett, Virginia where the majority of the time was spent qualifying the men for overseas shipment. Another group of men was sent overseas 23 April 1944. The remainder of original men left in the battalion were the non-commissioned officers and a few of the officers. New replacements came to the organization and were trained by the remaining cadre. On 5 October 1944 the battalion moved to Camp Kilmer N. J., the Port of Embarkation for the 78th Division. After eight days in Camp Kilmer they departed for England, 13 October 1944, on the General George S Squire, an American troop ship, sailed to Plymouth, England and landed after nine days at sea. Boarding a troop train at Plymouth, 26 October 1944 they journeyed to Bournemouth, England, where they did last minute training before crossing the English Channel. Three weeks later the battalion, embarked for France. After landing at Le Havre they were convoyed to Yvetot, France, 21 November 1944. The battalion was issued new equipment and essentials necessary for successful combat. Upon arrival in Tongres, Belgium, 7 December 1944, the battalion began a review of training with emphasis placed on the importance of each individual doing his job correctly. Here the men witnessed their first V-2 buzz-bomb. Many of these were seen frequently flying overhead and at this time the men realized that it would not be very long before they would be seeing combat. Finally, the battalion was making its last move before its initial attack. They left Tongres, Belgium, 11 December 1944 and moved to the vicinity of Lammersdorf, Germany. Artillery fire was heard here for the 'first time as it was being delivered on the enemy they were prepared to fight. On the night of 10 December 1944 a group of officers and men assembled from the various companies and were oriented as to the situation confronting them. The morning of 11 December 1944 the advance party moved to the front lines and prepared positions for the remainder of the battalion. On the morning of 13 December 1944 the Third Battalion proceeded to the front where they relieved the 102 Cavalry by making their first attack of the war on the town of Rollesbroich, Germany.
 
Blue Baptism in Battle

The view east from Lammersdorf was beautiful to the eye, rolling hedge-rowed fields broken by an occasional farmhouse, ravines and steep pine hills. But it was ugly ground for offensive fighting. The wooded hill-crests made natural strong--points for the enemy and gave them observation over all the natural or easy routes of attack. Those routes that remained were difficult, involved working through heavy brush and climbing steep and muddy heights. In addition the, enemy had adjusted in on every possible target, thoroughly mined the roads and trails, and chosen its defensive positions with great care and wisdom. The 310th mission was, to advance across this terrain, capture the town of Rollesbroich, the high ground north, of Rollesbroich, and a road junction and commanding ground south of Rollesbroich.

The early morning of December 13 was extremely cold and the snow 'which had fallen intermittently for three days was in places waist deep. Already thoroughly wet, the troops had spent a miserable night preparing for the attack, trying to keep warm, and wondering what the real thing would be like and how well they would fight. At 0400 the men of the Third Battalion moved forward, worked their way up a nearly vertical 2010 foot slope and passed through the 102nd Cavalry which had been holding the line. Meanwhile, to the north, the 311th Infantry and the 78th Reconnaissance Troop were firing everything they had, in order to deceive the enemy as to the' 310th's direction of attack. The Third Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Harry Lutz, attacked at 0600. Co K on the north, Co L on the south, Co I in reserve. Struggling over slippery terrain in intense darkness, stumbling into foxholes, scratched by branches, the men advanced undiscovered by the enemy until 0625, when, both companies received their first fire. Co L men quickly learned the noiseless approach of the mortar shell and the sound of rapid-fire German automatic weapons, while, Co K saw its first Kraut soldiers, who fired at them until out of ammunition and then surrendered. The companies continued to advance and at 0730 seized their initial objectives, small hills overlooking Rollesbroich from the north-west and south-west. At this point the enemy showed its strength.

Machine-gun fire from a concrete troop shelter atop a steep hill north of Rollesbroich pinned down most of Co K while heavy artillery and mortar fire fell in its midst. There was no need for instructions to dig in. The men dug quickly and automatically' as they had hit the ground when the first shells fell. But a few elements of the company managed to work their way south and were able to enter Rollesbroich.

Co L too, ran into a tough obstacle. The company was astride a hill just west of the crossroads at the southern end of Rollesbroich when it received intense machine-gun fire from one of the crossroad houses. One platoon was pinned down. When it became apparent, from the ineffectualness of L Co's return fire, that this was no ordinary house they were facing, the still mobile platoons bypassed the crossroads to the north and entered Rollesbroich. By noon, with the assistance of those Co K elements which had entered the town, they had cleared most of Rollesbroich's 50-odd battered buildings. The resistance was primarily from snipers with burp guns who fired until their ammunition was exhausted and then came out shouting "Kamerad" Co's K and L had taken Rollesbroich and were mopping up, but the crossroads-house, which was in reality a disguised troop shelter with thick concrete walls, was still a problem. Two men made a gallant attempt to destroy it by creeping to its very walls and placing charges against them.

However, the long trek and constant falling in the snow had thoroughly wet the charges and they failed to explode. An artillery concentration might have been affective, but Capt. Barton H. Hunter, Co L commander, refused to chance injuring further the wounded-men lying near the fort. Tank Destroyers were unable to approach, because the road, which had already been dubbed "88" Lane, was heavily mined and covered by artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire which prevented removal of the mines. One platoon of Co I which had the mission of protecting an engineer squad attempting to clear the road had already suffered heavy casualties. Co B attacked at 1345. It -advanced rapidly along the Lammersdorf-Rollesbroich road, "88 Lane" toward the Rollesbroich crossroads from where it expected to turn south to seize the road junction and high ground south of town. But fire from the camouflaged fort which had pinned down the L Co Platoon, and from other crossroads houses, forced the company to dig in after suffering 13 casualties. At 1400, after making personal reconnaissance, Lt. Col. Lutz committed Co I with the mission of swinging around Co K's left flank and securing the hill and troop shelters which were holding up Co K. The newly-committed unit advanced through sporadic resistance, capturing 20 prisoners, to a group of houses just southwest of Co K. There, severe opposition from groups which had infiltrated back to their positions, forced the company to dig in. Meanwhile the elements of Companies L and K which had cleared Rollesbroich dug defensive positions on the eastern outskirts of the town. The Third Battalion, 310th Infantry had gained its primary objective, Rollesbroich. Now the problem was to hold it.

There were enemy to the front, to the right and left and even to the rear. Men had to be fed and re-supplied with ammunition, casualties had to be evacuated. This seemed an almost impossible task in view of the fact that no vehicles could enter Rollesbroich because of the mined roads and artillery bombardment. This meant that all supplies and casualties would have to be carried by hand for distances, ranging up to two miles and this in darkness over extremely tough and difficult terrain. But the impossible was accomplished. All available men pitched in regardless of rank or of position.

Lt. Col. Lutz personally led and worked with several of the carrying parties. After dark the garrison of the crossroads fort picked up our casualties and gave them first aid. Three uninjured men Pfcs Biggs, Warren W. Hartwell and, Sandford Brooks, who were pinned down near them were also taken. But later that night when six of the Krauts attempted to take these men to the rear they were intercepted by Pfc Crighe Vandergrift and Pfc Carey F. Everitt who with their BAR lay concealed in a dump of bushes. Vandergrift signaled to Biggs, Hartwell and Brooks to duck and opened fire, killing two of the Germans and causing the rest to surrender. All Rollesbroich was cleared except the southern tip, and the battalion was engaged in holding the town, evacuating casualties and re-supplying, ammunition. The enemy garrison abandoned the troop shelter during the night leaving behind the I Co L wounded who had spent much of the night trying to convince the Germans to surrender. The enlisted men had been willing but their officer refused. Companies K and L mopped up in the northern part of Rollesbroich. Company I mopped up north of Rollesbroich and after dark, one platoon led by Lt. Maghran secured the high ground and troop shelter which had given Co K so much trouble. , Anti-tank Co., under cover of darkness, sent two platoons into Rollesbroich to give support if needed. The Medical Aid men and Litter bearers. continued to work without appreciable rest, treating casualties under fire without thought of their own safety, entering and carrying wounded from mine fields and hand-carrying litter cases across thousands of yards of the roughest kind. of ground. The 3rd Battalion had decisively won its first engagement, gained approximately a mile into the Siegfried Line and had killed or captured more than 150 of the enemy.

The following day, December 15, the units cleaned out snipers who had infiltrated the lines during the night, improved communications and consolidated positions. Capt. Owens, K Company Commander, personally led a combat patrol composed of part of the first platoon and the light machine-gun section whose mission was to capture a group of buildings located north of Rollesbroich and between the north end of the village and the bald hill which I Company had captured and out-posted the night before. After a terrific fight, they captured an enemy command post and a 75 mm gun position. Pfc Chilgion was killed in this action and Lts. Baskett and Maloney the two fighting buddies of Company K were both seriously wounded. Co I made contact with the 78th Recon. Troop on the left and set up an OP to maintain contact. One platoon of Co 310th Infantry Regiment returned to the minefield which had inflicted so many casualties upon it and, with an A-T Co mine squad and a squad of Engineers, cleared a path through it. The platoon passed through the opening, contacted Co I and then returned with the rest of the company to Ist Bn control. That night it was learned that, several miles to the south massed armored divisions under Field Marshal Von Rundstedt had smashed through the American front line on a broad front and were racing into Belgium.

The days that followed were tense and uneasy ones. Not more than five miles to the south Von Rundstedt's armor had already penetrated deeply into American lines. However by 25 January 1945 the Ardennes Bulge no longer existed and American troops had -fought their way back to their original lines. It was time to get moving again. During the attack on Konzen on 30 January 1945 a German officer captured by the Third Battalion described the attack as the most excellent and tactically sound he had ever witnessed. Co. I, supported by one platoon of Tank Destroyers, jumped off at 0530, while Cannon Co., working their 105's at better than 5 rounds a minute, fired a 10 minute concentration of 320 rounds into Konzen. The high ground east of Konzen (Konzen Hill) fell without resistance and Co I moved toward Konzen from the east. Co L with a platoon of tanks in support moved forward at 0800 and entered the town from the northeast. Resistance was light at first and the troops advanced rapidly through the shell-shattered village whose only remnant of former inhabitants were the horse, and cow carcasses which lined the roads. At the center of town however, two platoons and the headquarters group were held up by heavy rifle and machine fire from a large stone house.

Several direct bazooka hits set afire the lead supporting tank which had approached to within a hundred yards of the house. T/5 Henry C. Ficht, Co L aid-man, immediately rushed across the fire-raked field in front of the house, climbed the flaming tank turret, and was attempting to extricate the wounded tankers when he was killed by Burp gun fire. Ficht, was wearing a white snow suit with a large red cross painted on it as well as, the red crosses on his helmet. Seeing this Pfc, Richard L Lussier, who was returning to his platoon, after having successfully carried under fire an important message to .the Company Commander, rushed directly toward the house. Surprised by the suddenness and daring of his attack 14 of the enemy surrendered when he entered the building, and the remaining 15 who were in the cellar, were taken by four Co L men who assaulted the house immediately behind Lussier. The company also overcame determined resistance from a factory at the northwestern end of town and contacted Co I at 1300. During the afternoon Co L mopped up in the outskirts and at dark dug in on the southern tip. A total of 62 enemy were captured by the battalion whose total casualties for the operation were 10 wounded and two killed.

On 31 January Company K was attached to the 311th Infantry Regiment and moved to Kesternich to assist the 3rd'Battalion of the 311th Infantry Regiment in holding the town. K Company cleaned out the eastern end of Kesternich, defended it, but suffered heavy casualties in the action. The remainder of the battalion closed into billets in Simmerath at 0200 1 February and remained there until the morning of 5 February.

The Third Battalion attacked Steckenborn on the morning of 5 February under the temporary command of Combat Command R of the 7th Armored division. Company K was relieved the same morning and moved back to, Simmerath where it remained throughout the, Steckenborn action. Attached to the battalion for the attack on Steckenborn was a company of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers. The general plan called for Part of Combat Command R to seize the town of Steckenborn, while the other part seized Strauch.

At. 0630 Company L took up positions, prepared to fire on Strauch with MG's'and 60's. Due to the poor visibility Company L was unable to fire on Strauch and dug in to await orders to advance.' Both Company I and Company L were prepared to advance on Steckenborn on order of the CO of CCR. Company I was on the right t and Company. L on the left of the battalion sector. The 18th Field Artillery fired 4000 rounds of rocket tubes into. Steckenborn which it was later discovered completely terrified the Germans. At 0800-the Commanding Officer of Combat Command R ordered. the task force to begin its advance from the vicinity of Kesternich. At the same time Company L began its advance. At 0345 two platoons of tanks moved out from their line of departure at Kesternich leaving one platoon in reserve in the vicinity of Kesternich. Two tank destroyers were also assigned to each of the two infantry companies.

Company I moved from its line of departure 200 yards south of Steckenborn at 1015. The company reached the edge of town at 1030 without encountering enemy resistance.

On the left the task force from Kesternich including Company L had started into the town. At 1040 Company I reported artillery falling on their positions from cast of the Roer River and counter-battery fire was requested by the Battalion Commander on all known positions east of the river.

Company L encountered its first enemy resistance soon after entering the town. S/Sgt. Campbell, Co L's 1st platoon, led a successful assault on a pillbox, running at full speed with a beehive charge to blast open the door. S/Sgt. Essex of the 2nd platoon of Company I cleared the roads of mines so a tank, destroyer could be brought up to blast a pillbox. He completed the removal of the mines even though the enemy kept firing at him all the time. S/Sgt. Collins was killed when an "88" hit the building from which he was shooting' at the enemy. Company I was approximately two thirds of the way, through the town in its sector to the right, and reported one casualty in taking its objectives, while Company L reported that it had suffered no casualties at this time.

Company I reached the far side of the town and discovered three pillboxes beyond their position. Shaped charges and flame-throwers were requested to be brought up to destroy the pillboxes. However, Engineers were working on the to clear them of mines and two to three feet of snow, and delivery of the flame throwers and shaped charges from the Kesternich Ammunition Supply Point was delayed until late' afternoon. At 11400 the Battalion Commander requested that the two reserve tank destroyers be brought forward to assist in the capture of the pillboxes at 1500. By 1645 Company I reported one man killed and one wounded but had taken the pillboxes with the aid of the TD's. The Company continued to mop up in the northeast part of the town-with the tanks. It was necessary to clean out the three pillboxes since they would leave the Germans in a position to infiltrate back into town that night. At 1745 instructions were received from the Commanding Officer of Combat Command R to consolidate and hold the positions taken, paying particular attention to the north and northeastern positions of the town.

During the days operations Company I took 14 prisoners and Company L 41. During the operations on Steckenborn two companies with two platoon of tanks- and one section of tank destroyers had been used. Company L suffered no casualties but Company I had two enlisted men killed and one Officer and 12 Enlisted Men wounded during the day. A "moderate" amount of 'shelling took place during the operation but some casualties were incurred from it as well as from the small arms. Both companies held their positions and were passed through or. 6 February by elements of the 7th Armored Division which moved up to Hechelscheid.
 
The Battle for Schmidt

The battalion moved from Steckenborn into an assembly area among several blown up pillboxes north of Strauch just before dark on the 6th of February. Having fought all day and into the night the day before, the men had little trouble falling asleep after a good hot meal brought up by the, faithful kitchen crews. The night was wet and cold, but the men managed to get a little sleep in their foxholes which they lined with straw to keep from lying in the mud. During the night the battalion received orders to attack astride the road toward Schmidt, passing through the 1st and 2nd battalions whose exact location in the woods was not known, but who had been reported to have reached a well prepared road block that consisted of a steel gate backed up by a huge crater which covered the whole width of the road. The battalion was to attack east just before daylight and capture the fortifications and wooded areas at the base of the high ground which overlooked the fortified town of Schmidt. The 311th Infantry was to attack from the south on the right of the 3rd Battalion to seize the high ground overlooking Schmidt and the capture Schmidt itself. The plan of attack was as follows, Company K was to lead the attack, attacking astride the road and capture the pillboxes located all along the road at the front of the hill overlooking Schmidt. L Company echeloned to the left rear was to clean out the woods north of the road and protect the battalion left flank: I Company echeloned to the right rear was to clear out the woods south of the road and protect the right flank. Co A of the 774th Tank Battalion and two platoons of Co B 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the battalion for the operation. One platoon of tanks and tank destroyers were to attack the pillboxes with the leading elements of Co. K. Moving through the area, which was once a German Military encampment but now a mass of shattered buildings, K Co with the 3rd platoon leading started the attack astride the road. The woods on either side of the road were studded with pillboxes, and the first light of day revealed the bodies of wounded and dead from the previous days fighting. The woods, once thickly planted pine groves, were now a mass of splintered poles, the ground covered by shattered limbs and whole Parts of trees. As the men moved on they came upon a pillbox which was converted into a hospital during the night before by an English speaking German Army doctor who was caring for more than a score of both wounded enemy and American, soldiers. A few yards further down the road was the catered road block. Lt. Blackburn and his engineer platoon cleared a path to the right of the road for the tanks, which a few minutes later caught up with the riflemen, who had just made a welcome contact at Gelensbeig, with the remnants of G Company who had been out of contact with their battalion throughout the long night before. First enemy fire was drawn when the men moved east from Gelensburg. The 3rd Platoon aggressively outflanked an enemy group defending a pillbox on the left of the road and in a few minutes 13 enemy with their hands locked behind their heads were marching to the rear. About this time the Kraut artillery fire started coming in. The leading tanks deployed off to the left of the road to join the fight, but were halted when they came upon a minefield. Capt. Owens had already dispatched Pfc Norwood back to the roadblock where the engineers were working and as a result work was begun to clear a path just about the time when the tanks were halted. Pvt. Falk of the Engineer squad, dissatisfied with the progress of the work put himself in charge and the men inspired by his example began pulling mines out of the ground like mad. Artillery shells were whistling in but the men kept right on working. Only one mine was left and the path would be clear. Someone remembered at this time that they were taught to, pull mines with a long rope because the Germans sometimes booby trapped them so they used a rope on this last one. As they yanked the rope there was a terrific explosion no one was scratched, the rope had saved their life. Pvt. Falk was wounded a few minutes later while he was removing mines from the road because he was too busy to duck when a Kraut shell whistled in. The attack moved swiftly when the tanks came up only one more pillbox and the right half of the battalion objective would be secured, A few rounds from the tanks and a rush by the 3rd platoon took this one. The platoon with the tanks' inspired by their own success did not stop and went on toward Schmidt capturing pillbox after pillbox. Capt. Hope, Bn S 3, was riding in the lead tank in order to co-ordinate their efforts with those of the 3rd Platoon. He was wounded while leaning out of his tank going over plans with Lt. Friedberg, 3rd platoon leader, when a terrific artillery concentration fell on their position. Sgt. Jack Rogers, noted for his exploits with his grenade launcher was wounded at the same time along with several others. T/Sgt. Daniels, Plt. Sgt. of the 3rd Platoon, who began the attack at the rear of his platoon was now leading the assault along with Lt. Applegate, Mortar Observer. T/Sgt. Sahlin led the 3rd platoon around to the left recapturing Capt. Murphy, Co G, who was captured the night before, but who in. the meantime had talked the bewildered Kraut soldiers into surrendering. Prisoners were swarming in droves to the rear as the Ist platoon pulled up abreast of the third platoon. When the Company halted to reorganize they were sitting on the high ground overlooking Schmidt six hundred yards away. They had captured what was to have been the initial objective of the 311th Infantry.

L Company moving through the woods on the left suffered many casualties from one of the heaviest enemy artillery concentrations ever witnessed. Among, the wounded was Lt. Schenck, the fearless leader of the 3rd Platoon. The Company captured a number of pillboxes in the woods taking the confused Germans by surprise and moved abreast of K Co on the left and occupying the high ground overlooking Kommerscheid. Co I cleared the woods south of the road and to the right of K Co. They too came under terrific artillery fire, but were more fortunate than Co L. Lt. Fields, the popular section leader of Co M, Mortar Observer with Co I, was killed when a Kraut mortar shell fell beside him. The battalion halted on order and was passed through in the late afternoon by the 3rd Battalion, 311th Infantry whose objective was Schmidt. The Battalion C. P. was established in the first pillbox captured by K Co's 3rd platoon. It served as Regimental C. P. and was visited by General Parker, Division Commander, and General Collins the Corps Commander the following day when the battalion was fighting for Schmidt. Casualties for the days operations were 4 killed and 38 wounded.

The night was cold and wet just like the night before and the men hardly slept at all. Orders were received during the night that the 310th Infantry with 3rd Battalion leading would clear the road from Schmidt to Heimbach, seizing the high ground over the Roer River, thereby cutting off the troops in the vicinity of the dam. It was reported that Schmidt had been captured and that the 3rd Battalion would pass through the 311th Infantry and start the attack some where east of Schmidt. The battalion moved out at 0530 and a few minutes later were met by Major Kennedy who commanded the Ist Battalion, 311th Infantry at the western entrance of the town. He reported that friendly troops of the 3rd Battalion 311th Infantry were dug in a hundred yards ahead and that the enemy was still holding out in the town. This information proved to be correct because the third platoon of I Company drew fire from houses on three sides at daylight as they started moving into the town. Lt. Kelley, 3rd platoon leader rose firing his "Grease Gun" in an effort to rally his men forward, but he was quickly cut down with a few others who followed his example. Lt. Perrin who brought the tanks and TD's up to join the attack of the 3rd platoon tried to point out the houses where the fire was coming from to a tank commander but each time he crawled up on the tank a sniper would try to pick him off. The first platoon of Co I was thrown in on the north flank of the third platoon while the 2nd platoon worked along the south flank to reduce the resistance on the flanks of the third platoon. With the three platoons abreast the Company began a slow, but steady advance through the town. The Germans defended practically every house and stubbornly fell back to help defend succeeding houses. Many dead enemy were found in the houses and the moaning of the enemy wounded could be heard interspersed with the firing. The first platoon working with the' light machine-gun section on the north side of the town was under continual enemy machine-gun fire. I coming from Harscheidt, the village northeast of Schmidt which supposedly h taken by American troops but apparently now had not. Using the piles of rubble for protection against this fire the men kept right on fighting the enemy in Schmidt. Private Norman A. Funk, leading scout of his platoon distinguished himself by aggressively leading his platoon from house to house blazing away with his M-1 and pitching grenades, into windows and doorways, but his luck didn't last and he paid, the supreme price. Sergeant Erickson was killed with a hand grenade while leading his squad through the piles of rubble. T/Sgt. Carlson along with Sgt. Simmons squad, shooting out of windows in a house they had just entered had a field day shooting Krauts, at a range of one hundred yards. They picked them off one by one as they tried to escape to the shelter of a pillbox from a house which was under attack. Seventeen bodies were counted later along the path that they ran for shelter. Finally at 1430 after fighting their way through the many pillboxes and fortified houses and piles of rubble, the men reached the eastern end of the town. Schmidt, the key to the defenses of the Schwammanual Dam, was now captured and the remainder of the battalion moved forward through the town to gain its mission, that of clearing the road, Heimbach, and capturing the high ground one overlooking the Roer River.

When the medical section of the 3rd Battalion moved into Schmidt it was necessary to establish the aid station in a cellar. Evacuation there was a problem since the troops were exposed-and had to be evacuated by Weasel. Capt. Colwell made the rounds like a regular country doctor, visiting each company under enemy observation.

Pfc. Charles T. Kelley found two ambulances at a Nazi aid station at Schmidt. One these: he got running and evacuated, many with it.

Lt. Janes, the 'Battalion S 2, observing from the upper story of a house in Schmidt a few moments after its capture, located several enemy machine gun positions astride the road on the high ground in the vicinity of Nuennhof about 2000 yards east of Schmidt. With this information a coordinated attack was planned for 1600 with Co L advancing east from Schmidt, attacking astride the road to capture the high ground in the vicinity of Schiedbaum about 1500 yards east of Schmidt. K Cc was to take a covered route through the woods to the right of L Co and capture the wooded knoll southeast of Scheidbaum and then envelope the enemy positions in the vicinity of Nuennhof. Plans for artillery and mortar fire to be delivered on the enemy positions located by Lt. Janes were made. At 1530 elements of the 2nd Battalion 311th Infantry were seen advancing east in K Co s zone of attack. This called f or a change in plans which resulted in L Company attacking alone with K Co to follow in column. At 1545 word was received that the artillery would not fire because friendly, troops of the 311th Infantry were located in the area. This was found later to be incorrect, but Company L jumped off at 1600 without artillery support. Two platoons of tanks started with the attack but after advancing about five hundred yards, three tanks were hit by fire from a group of five enemy tanks located on the road between Scheidbaum and Nuennhof. That ended the tank support for L Company. 'The 1st and 3rd platoons personally led by Lt.'s Barzeley and Ober continued the attack in spite of withering machine gun fire. With a handful of men they reached the few buildings which comprised the settlement of Scheidbaum where they came under fire from the five enemy tanks, which a few minutes ago had knocked out their friendly tanks. Pfc. Garcia with Pfc. Lussier assisting fired a few bazooka rounds at the leading tank, setting it on fire from the upper story of one of the houses. A few seconds after they clambered down the steps with one precious bazooka round left, the house collapsed from a barrage fired by the tanks. At this time men from the First Battalion coming up on the left with marching fire were a most welcome sight, It was almost dark now, the enemy tanks and machine guns were still blazing away, and no artillery fire on them could be obtained because of faulty information of friendly troops being located there. The men dug in when darkness set in. During the night word was received that the 60th Infantry of the 9th Division would pass through our lines east of Schmidt prior to daylight in the morning and proceed down the road to Heimbach. Hot chow and ammunition were brought up during the night and plans were made resuming the. attack the following morning on the left flank of the 60th Infantry to secure the high ground overlooking the Roer River at Aberden and Blens thereby securing the left flank of the 9th Division. At 0700 the 60th Infantry passed through L Companies positions and were stopped by machine gun fire from the positions which held up Co. L the night before, but the enemy tanks had pulled out during the night. At 1000 men from Co C. 310th Infantry outflanked these positions from the north allowing the 60th Infantry to advance. In the meantime the battalion with Co K leading was pushing out to the northeast entering the woods north and east of Scheidbaum. The woods was filled with fanatical enemy who had just destroyed their own artillery pieces and had taken up firing positions in dugouts manning machine guns and rifles. The fire was deadly accurate and took a heavy toll in lives. Within a five minute period, Sgt. Sielski and Pvts. Siemon, Carlberg, and Pickering fell mortally wounded. Privates Benreiff, Pasquale, Bennett and Fisher also of K Co died in this action. Lt. Saunders, Co K's fighting executive officer arrived in a nick of time with the third platoon and two tanks which had become separated from the company as a result of the intermingling, of units of the 1st Bn 310th and the 60th Infantry with those of the 3rd Battalion. The tanks zigzagging their way through the trees with the 3rd platoon close at hand soon broke up the fanatical enemy defenders, many of whom fought to their death. K Company reached its final objective and shortly after noon the men were looking down at the river below and were viewing the destroyed bridges over the river at Blens and Abenden. L Company with Lt. Ober in Command as a result of Capt. Hunter being wounded and evacuated in the morning, pulled up on K Companies left overlooking the town of Blens. The woods which K Co had fought through was littered with enemy dead, but among the enemy dead there lay the bodies of several men of the 3rd Battalion. In addition to K Co's dead there was Lt. Mullins and Pvt. Robabowski of Co L who were ambushed while reconnoitering their position. Through the tireless efforts of Major Pierce, the A & P Platoon and the Anti-Tank Platoon, a road was built through mine fields and mud holes and with the aid of Company carrying parties the men got a little hot food the first night. By noon of the following day, Pfc. Dragon drove his weasel loaded with hot chow and ammunition to the company positions, some of which were difficult to reach even on foot. Nobody slept at all the first night on account of the rain and the fact that holes had to be dug. By dark of the second night, bedrolls had been brought up and the men had covers constructed over their holes to protect them from, the weather and from the deadly enemy artillery.

Under cover of darkness on the night of February 12, the first and second platoons of Co L preceded by a patrol led by Sergeant Pologi slipped into Blens and occupied the town without firing a shot. The few enemy who were left in the village were captured by surprise the following morning. The occupation of this town remained unknown to the enemy. The one rifle platoon from Co L and the machine gun platoon of Company M which comprised the occupying force was fed and supplied by carrying parties at night. They supplemented their rations by milking a cow every night, which they had found in a barn. However one night Lt. Nolph and Sgt. Pologi, who never bothered to be scared by the enemy, got a big scare when they tried to milk a bull in the darkness. From their positions in Blens the men would call down artillery and mortar fire on enemy positions just across the river a few hundred yards away.

On the morning of February 14, Company L's Command Post was subjected to the most deadly and accurate mortar concentration ever encountered, causing over twenty casualties. Lt. Saunders, who had just taken command of L Company when Lt. Ober left the Company to take command of Company B in the first battalion, was mortally wounded. Also mortally, wounded were Corporal De Loach the courageous communications sergeant, and Pvts. Buchmann, Rosenbaum, Torres and Tester. The remainder of the month of February was spent in recuperating from the fighting which carried the battalion from Konzen to the Roer River and in training for the fighting to come. The men worked on small unit problems, bayonet training, and firing of the BAR, Bazooka, and rifle grenades. During this period two patrols from Co I, both led by S/Sgt. Field crossed the Roer River to capture a prisoner for the Division G 2. On their first try they ran into too many of the enemy and had to shoot their way out killing a number of the enemy in doing so. On their second attempt, they came back empty handed because the enemy had taken off into the hills. Lt. Perrin, Bn S 3, Sgt. Sloop, second platoon of K Company and Pfc. Wheeler crossed the river at dusk in an assault boat to reconnoiter and clear a path trough an enemy anti-personnel minefield. In the vicinity of "'Blue". The patrol removed home made box mines which were brought back to the 3rd Bn for training purposes.

The "Blue" Battalion "Blue" being the code word used for the 3rd Bn of Infantry Regiments, had not only tasted combat but had taken several good swallows. They were seasoned combat Infantrymen now and in their hearts was love, admiration and respect for their fellowmen, their officers and an undivided loyalty to their duty.
 
Roer to Rhine

The 3rd Battalion, 310th Infantry, because of its persistent gallantry, exceptional heroism and esprit de corps in the face of unusually difficult and hazardous conditions made an invaluable contribution to the success of the Allied offensive on the Western Front. It never failed to accomplish an assigned mission and because of its consistent record of achievement it was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its combat action for the period 1-15 March 1945.

The following record of action is a summary of the operations of the 1st to the 15th March 1945.

The 3rd Battalion, attached to Combat Command A, 9th Armored Division, crossed the Roer River in the early morning of 2 March and marched 9 miles to capture Langendorf and the strongly defended Wollersheim woods. The following day it attacked and captured Merzenich, Sinzenich and Florin.

On 4 March after a grueling 5 mile advance through deep mud under continual artillery and small arms fire, costing 57 casualties, the battalion captured Euskirchen, key road, rail, supply and communications center for the German forces west of the Rhine. By midnight advanced elements of the battalion, two miles forward of friendly troops on the left and four miles forward of friendly troops on the right, made possible the crossing of the Erft Canal east of the city the following morning.

On 5 March, without having had any rest, one company, against determined, skillful opposition, battled across the Erft Canal and secured Roitzheim, south of Euskirchen, after a 12-hour battle. 165 prisoners, including 3 SS Captains and SS non-commissioned officers were captured, 62 enemy were killed, 4 concrete gun emplacements and 30 machine-guns were destroyed, and a route over which supporting armor could negotiate the Erft Canal and continue the advance to the Rhine was secured.

On 7 March the battalion captured Bad Neuenahr, secured 4 bridges and crossed the Alit River on 8 March, taking the high ground to the south, which controlled the main supply route to the newly won Remagen bridgehead.

After marching all night, the battalion crossed the Remagen bridge under heavy artillery fire early on March 10. That afternoon, it advanced through withering artillery fire and air strafing and bombing, to secure high ground south of Kretzhaus. This high ground overlooked the Remagen bridge and the area for miles around and was the key point from which the enemy directed artillery and mortar fire on that area. In order to reach the enemy observation posts on the top of the hill it was necessary to scale nearly vertical cliffs in the face of direct fire from these enemy positions at the summit. This was undertaken without hesitation, the enemy equipment, including three radios was destroyed and the defending enemy were killed or captured.

This salient was held for 3 days before friendly troops closed in on the flanks. During this time, a strong enemy counterattack toward the Ludendorff bridge was repulsed. The counter-.attacking force consisted of at least a battalion of infantry supported by heavy artillery fire and spearheaded by seven enemy tanks.

On 15 March, Major General Louis A. Craig, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division, assigned the battalion the mission of capturing and holding at all costs, Kretzhaus and the Kallenborn road junction. The battalion was made responsible for accomplishing the mission regardless of the other units in the vicinity. This high ground and road junction which controlled eight roads and a railway line was the last enemy strongpoint covering the Remagen bridge, and had already been attacked four times without success by other units.

Despite the fact that its commander had been wounded, and with greatly reduced strength, the battalion took this ground and held it against the most determined resistance by tanks, artillery, automatic weapons and small arms.

For this action the Third Battalion, 310th Infantry received a commendation from Major General Louis A. Craig, Ninth Infantry Division Commander. The commendation read in part: "It is particulate desired to emphasize the fine combat work of the Third Battalion. It was engaged at one of the most hotly contested areas encountered and its participation at 150 536 March to secure the vital road junction finally cracked the? Last determined stand of the Germans near the observation line closest to the bridge. This is a fighting organization and is a credit to itself and to any organization it teams with."

The battalion was also commended by Major General John W. Leonard, Commanding General, Ninth Armored Division and Colonel Thomas L. Harrold, Commanding Officer, CCA, Ninth Armored Division who wrote in part:

"During the succeeding seven days, the battalion seized all objectives assigned to it, pressing the attack both day and night. The success of this battalion was due to the courage, unrelenting effort, and determination of all ranks."

But to fully document the extraordinary heroism, gallantry and magnificent esprit de corps shown. by the Third Battalion, 310th Infantry in the face of extremely difficult and hazardous conditions, and its continued determination despite severe exhaustion and depleted personnel, it is necessary to tell the complete story of its actions from the crossing of the Roer River to its attack and capture of the last enemy-held height overlooking the Remagen bridge.

On the night of the 1st March 1945 the 3rd Battalion moved out of its defensive positions west of the Roer River and crossed an Engineer treadway bridge at Blens in the order of I, K and L Companies, single file with interval of two yards between men. They marched from Blens on the east side of the Roer to Abenden where the men dropped their blanket rolls and continued the march at 0200 to Berg. In the little town of Berg the 3rd Battalion was attached to Combat Command A, Ninth Armored Division, which consisted of light and medium tanks and half tracks. After a briefing, orders were received to move out to an assembly area. There were no administrative casualties. CCA moved toward Wollersheirn at 0900. The Third Battalion mission was to march through Wollersheirn upon its clearance by the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, which was attacking it at that time, and take Langendorf, Merzenich and Sinzenich. The battalion, marching in order K, Hq. I, L was halted on the road west of Wollersheirn because the 60th AIB was unable to advance due to enemy resistance in the wooded area north of town. This enemy group in the woods was also holding up elements of the 60th Infantry Regiment in Embken to the North.

The battalion was delayed for sometime near Wollersheim and "dug in" in an open field in full view of enemy snipers. At this point the battalion received approximately 20 rounds of enemy 88 MM fire, however, they suffered no casualties at this time.

At 1330 orders were received to be prepared to seize the wooded area north-east of Wollersheirn and to seize the town of Langendorf, 3000 meters east of Wollersheim. Reconnaissance was made immediately, the attack planned and the following fragmentary attack order issued:
 

Picture: TREADWAY BRIDGE OVER THE ROER
The battalion attacks at 1530 with Company K seizing the wooded area north and east of Wollersheim, Company L echeloned to the left rear, mopping up the woods behind Company K and protecting the left flank of the battalion. Company I to attack, bypassing Wollersheim to the south and seize Langendorf. Company I to attack on order when the western edge of the woods has been cleared by Company K. Attachments: Company K, I Light Tk Plt, 1 Med Tk Plt, 1 Plt Company M; Company I: 1 Med Tk Plt. 1st Plt Company M supports attack of Company K with fire into enemy positions in woods. When fire is masked, change positions and fire in support of Company I with fires on high ground west of Langendorf. I Med Tk Plt in reserve firing initially in support of Company I. Mortar Plt in general support."

The battalion moved forward while the Company Commanders were at the Battalion CP receiving the order.

At this point the enemy held Wollersheim, and was entrenched in the woods to the northeast, which gave them fire control over the open terrain west and north of town.

Companies K and L attacked at 1530. Heavy mortar, artillery and sniper fire from Wollersheim and the outskirts of Embken covered the, 800 yards of open terrain which had to be crossed to reach the woods. But the companies advanced without hesitation and covered the ground by platoon rushes between terrain features. Upon entering the woods, 1st and 2nd platoons leading, 3rd platoon in support, Company K immediately encountered extremely heavy small arms and machine gun opposition.. Two casualties were suffered, one of whom refused to be evacuated and continued the attack. The enemy was well dug in and determined, and advances could be made only after killing the gunners who were exceptionally well supplied with ammunition. The advance was made by assault or marching fire, although on several occasions enemy resistance compelled the attackers to resort to the bayonet. Dusk fell when the attacking platoons were about midway to their objectives, but the attack was pressed. Contact was maintained by connecting files and at 2030, after suffering 12 casualties, Companies K and L were on their objective. This action brought about the fall of Wollersheim and enabled the 60th Infantry Regiment to, attack the following morning and, capture Zulpich without resistance. Positions were consolidated and the troops dug in. Sixty-five prisoners were captured in the operation and an estimated 20 enemy soldiers were killed. The intense darkness, and danger inherent in exposed tear and flanks made necessary an almost continual guard by all personnel and permitted little sleep for the troops who had already been sleepless for more than 40 hours.

Company I moved east from the hill ' southwest of Wollersheim at 1630. Sniper fire from the last two houses in Wo ' Hersheim. and machine-gun fire from a haystack were encountered and overcome. A heavy-mortar and artillery barrage -fell on, the company. In spite of this resistance and 'the fact that three of the tanks became stuck and had to be towed, by 1924 the company had secured Langendorf and dug in on the eastern perimeter. Eighty-five prisoners were taken and more than forty-five killed.

At 0330 a battalion runner brought Company L a written order from the battalion, S-3 to attack the town of Merzenich and be prepared to assist by fire, Company K which was to attack Sinzenich. No enemy information - was available although it was knovn that Burvenich, to the southwest, was in friendly hands. Company L was to meet a platoon of medium tanks, I section of heavy machine guns and a litter squad along the Wollersheim-Langendorf highway. The Platoon Leaders were oriented at 040a by the Company Commander and the Company moved out at 0630. The proposed attachments were not found upon reaching the highway, never the less the company went into the attack as ordered. A guide was left behind for the attachments and the Battalion Commander was notified of the action decided upon. Moving past the highway into open terrain, artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire from the right were received. The company continued to move forward while half a squad quickly outflanked the enemy machine-gun position, neutralized it, captured 3 and killed 2 enemy and returned to the platoon. Under constant mortar and artillery fire, the company moved to within 500 yards of Merzenich, and following an artillery TOT at 0745, assaulted the town, the tanks arriving just in time to take part in the assault. Although clearing the town was made difficult by large numbers of civilians, by 081" it was secure,.- At 1115 two platoons moved to a point northwest of Sinzenich to support the Company K attack. Company L suffered 5 casualties. T/Sgt. Lindsay, anti-tank platoon Sgt. was killed by artillery fire during the attack. The 1st platoon of Co M led by Lt. Barnett joined Company L as they entered the town of Merzenich and assisted in setting up a defense of the town after it was captured.

The 1st platoon of Company M then prepared to fire into Sinzenich to support Company K's attack on that town.

Company K which had assembled in a draw southwest of Merzenich, moved to an area of departure at 1145 and under an extremely heavy artillery barrage and heavy small arms fire from Sinzenich launched its attack, accompanied by a platoon of medium tanks. Two hundred yards from the town, the 3rd platoon, led -by Lt. Durk, was pinned down by small arms fire from a tower on the west edge of town and machine gun fire from the left flank. Several rounds of 88 mm fire were directed at the platoon while they lay pinned down in the open field. The tanks were slow in moving up but upon arriving liquidated the enemy opposition from, the tower and machine gun position.

 
Picture: DUG IN ALONG THE ROER RIVER

S/Sgt. Cornelius J. Coughlin, a squad leader in the 3rd platoon, although seriously wounded, retained consciousness long enough to direct the tank fire. S/Sgt. Charles F Mason, wounded in the hand, crawled 20 -yards to another wounded man, dressed his wound with his one hand and then, with another man, carried him to a shell crater.

The 3rd platoon, which at this time consisted of about 13 men assaulted the town under the fire of the machine guns from the tanks. Heavy enemy artillery fire fell on the town as the platoon proceeded through the northern sector, attacking the houses with grenades, and small arms fire', many of which were strongly defended. Rocks were used to simulate grenades when the supply of live grenades was depleted. The effect on the Krauts was the same, they would come running out of their houses shouting "Kamerad". Both male and female civilians who had been supplied with weapons offered so much interference that finally, all of them, 1650, had to be taken prisoner and placed under guard. The 3rd platoon reached the eastern limits of town at 1330 with 12 men, after killing more than 20 and capturing 32 enemy soldiers. The 1st and 2nd platoons advanced through the southern sector of the town mopping up as they went and organized in the defense of Sinzenich. Company K assembled the civilian people in the church, priest's home and attempted to put them in positions protected from the still heavy artillery concentrations landing on the town. The company then received a hot meal and was re-supplied with ammunition. Enemy casualties in this operation were 10 killed, number of wounded unknown. Company K's casualties were 18 wounded and 4 killed, unusually heavy due to heavy artillery fire and the small arms fire received upon entering the village. A perimeter defense was set up around the village that night and the Company continued to round up civilian and military personnel until approximately 2 100. Little rest was received by any of the personnel during the evening.

 
Picture: T/SGT. HERMAN LINDSEY, LT. PERRIN, SGT. TUREK CAPT. MASTERPOLE AND CAPT. SMITH

At 1400, Company I without attachments attacked and captured Florin against light resistance. Four enemy were captured. The 1st platoon of Company M was prepared to support Company I by fire but as there was no resistance they didn't fire, joined Company I in Florin and then reverted to M Company control in Nernmenich.

The town of Lovenich was taken by elements of the 310th Infantry Regiment simultaneous with Company I's attack on Florin.

The battalion marched to Nernmenich, closed in at 1300, checked equipment and briefed personnel for the attack on the vital road, rail and communications center of Euskirchen. Euskirchen, which had a peacetime population of 30,000 was an important army supply center.

The Company Commanders were oriented at 1300 near the line of departure at the eastern edge of Nernmenich and received their orders. The plan was for Company I to lead the attack, with one platoon of light tanks to assist in finding and neutralizing enemy resistance in the battalion zone of advance. Upon reaching the western outskirts of Euskirchen, Company I would be joined by one platoon of medium tanks and would proceed to the southeast and secure the bridges over the Erft Canal at Roitzheim. Company L, initially echeloned to the left rear with the mission of protecting the battalion left flank, and as Company I approached the western outskirts of Euskirchen, to move to the left and abreast of Company I and secure the bridges at the eastern end of Euskirchen. Company K was to follow Company I at 500 yards, protecting the battalion right flank and mop up along the main street and the railroad tracks running east and west through Euskirchen. The 1st MG platoon of Company M would move by bounds in direct support of Company I. The 2nd M~G platoon was attached to Company L. The Mortar Platoon was to be in general- support, displacing when necessary- to keep within supporting distance of the rifle troops. The medium tank company was to move by bounds behind Company L prepared initially to attack in mass, and when Company's I and L were ready to assault the western outskirts of Euskirchen, the company would deploy and the tank platoons would join in the assault with the respective companies to which they would be attached. In order that the advance be made as rapidly as possible, the leading elements of the battalion were ordered not to engage in any mopping up operations and to bypass, if possible, any determined resistance,

One section of heavy machine guns was attached to each of the attacking rifle companies as the battalion moved forward at 1400 and began the difficult and hazardous 5-mile cross-country advance through enemy resistance to Euskirchen. The flat terrain had been recently plowed and movement in the thick mud and steady rain was difficult and exhausting. The entire route was under incessant observed artillery and mortar bombardment and several time direct 88 mm fire was encountered. Machine-gun fire from the railroad tracks above Ulpenich and Durscheven, and sniper fire from Irreshdim was encountered almost immediately upon crossing the LD. The 81 mm Mortar section was in direct support of the Battalion during the attack across country. -It was not known what -was in front so it was necessary to reconnoiter for positions -as the unit moved along.. The M Company Commander moved in front of the mortars and picked suitable positions for them as they advanced and led them into those positions. The Mortars were very mobile and ready, to move at a minutes notice all through this attack. Northwest of enemy-held Elsig, small arms resistance from snipers became too severe to be bypassed and one platoon from Company I and one from Company L entered northern Elsig. They cleared the northern part of town, killing 5 and capturing 11 enemy soldiers while the battalion continued its advance.

Even, when the enemy fire was most heavy and casualties highest the men kept moving toward their objective, seldom hitting the ground, and urging one another on with shouts and humor. Not one squad scattered, and not a man dropped out unless severely wounded. Most of the weapons became clogged with mud, and the men attempted to clean them while marching.

It was raining very hard and it was difficult to see very far ahead due to the haze. Company I was moving very fast and since it was desired to give the company direct support a section of mortars was attached and followed the company by 1000 yard bounds. This attached section of mortars was fired on by burp guns north of Elsig. It was necessary to stop the mortar fire at this point and the opposition was overcome with M 3 grease guns and a Thompson sub-machine gun. The section had an ammunition supply problem since it was necessary to hand carry all supplies across country from Nernmenich.

Upon reaching a point 500 yards east of the barracks area in Euskirchen, Company I was joined by medium tanks: After moving forward another 100 yards heavy A-T gun and machine gun fire was encountered. Although one light and one medium tank were knocked out and the remainder withdrew 700 yards, Company I continued forward approximately 200 yards Where it came under heavy small arms fire-from a group of the barracks buildings which covered the eastern approaches to town. The troops had advanced so rapidly that the artillery was out of range. Upon learning this the company assaulted the barracks without artillery support, and passed through the area toward its objective. By this time it was dark. Progress within the city was extremely difficult because of shell craters, rubble-blocked streets and snipers, but finally a route was found. The company and supporting armor reached the southeast edge of town at 2100 and prepared to continue toward Roitzheim. At this time-an order was received to consolidate and await further orders. The company established guard posts and began to clean its equipment which by this time had become so mud-caked as to be nearly unserviceable. 14 casualties had been suffered.

M Company's mortars displaced to the barracks area on the west edge of Euskirchen while the rifle companies were still fighting in the town. The mortars took four prisoners in the barracks area and consolidated positions in the east end of the area. It was apparent that close continuous support by the mortars would by difficult since the men would have to stop firing their mortars to defend themselves against enemy snipers,

Meanwhile Company L reorganized under fire inside the barracks area. Casualties had been extremely heavy, particularly among officers and non-commissioned officers. The platoon leader and 2 squad leaders in each of the attacking platoons, the Ist and 3rd, were casualties. Upon reorganization the company cleared the barracks area, dug in and sent patrols to probe deeper into the city.

Capt. Owens, Company Commander of K Company, when interviewed on the Euskirche.1 action remarked in part: "It was raining hard and the day was miserable. At this time it1was 1700 (near Elsig) and we-knew it would be dark by the time we reached our objective. We were thankful it was getting dark because we knew it would reduce, the chances of the jerries hitting us with sniper or 88 fire. We were held in this position for approximately 10 minutes and pushed ahead, using turnip patches and dung heaps for concealment. Company L pushed off to the left to enter the town and they suffered quite a few casualties from small arms fire. We pushed to the right of Company L to enter the barracks area and there met the S-3 who told us how to enter the village. Then he wanted two platoons to enter the village and one platoon to go along the railroad, at the edge of town. The men were so exhausted they had to force themselves to advance.

It was dark by this time. The platoons moved on into the barracks area I put them under the command of Lt. Durk and told him to enter the center of the town and I was going with the 2nd platoon along the railroad. We found in the barracks area, in mopping it up, about 10 German prisoners. The town has in shambles. Our air corps had one this previously. Streets were littered up with rubble. It was impossible to search out the houses as most of them were huge structures. We entered the town with little or no opposition. I took my Hq. group and my communications Sgt. with me and also my mortar FO from M Company. In moving along the RR track I bypassed my 2nd platoon. We had previously designated the rendezvous point and there, where to set up a perimeter defense in our own small sector in the town itself. Upon arriving at the rendezvous point we immediately took the personnel we had and sent them on patrols to locate the bulk of the company and to' find out if anything had happened. During this phase of the operation, Lt. Col. Harry Lutz found the 1st and 3rd platoons under the command of Lt. Durk. The 2nd platoon bypassed the rendezvous point and entered a hotel approximately 200 yards beyond there and set up a defense. In searching this house we found two Jerries very comfortably set up with their mistresses in the basement of the building. Before being removed one of the Jerries was extremely cooperative in showing T/Sgt. Tracey his P 38 pistol he had hidden in the cupboard. Here we finally reorganized and attempted to get dry, but there was no heat and it was impossible to get our bed rolls to us. The night was miserable and black as the gares of hell. We shivered all night and even though the town was at one time a wealthy city, it was very obvious the Germans had taken all their bedding and blankets. The men were exhausted but we still set up our defenses. The following morning we received a hot breakfast. The cooks had come into the town in jeeps with the food under actual fire. Major Pierce, Battalion Ex. Officer in trying to locate the company CPs during the night, captured 9 prisoner-, himself. Casualties in this operation were surprisingly light. We sent out four patrols to the railroad bridge and the highway bridges on the cast edge of the city. Each time the patrols came under sniper fire from a factory in the edge (if town. The patrols discovered that all three bridges had been demolished."

The night was intensely dark, cold and stormy, and since it was impossible to clear out the city, because of its size and the great number of rubble-blocked buildings, it was necessary for all personnel to remain alert and on guard throughout the night. This required exceptional endurance and spirit, for the men were completely wet and suffering severely from exhaustion. Since 1 March, they had marched more than 18 miles, at least 8 of which had been under fire, fought 3 battles and had barely managed 8 hours of sleep.

150 prisoners were captured during the attack on Euskirchen. The battalion suffered 56 casualties, primarily from shell fragments, which brought the 3-day battle casualties total to 96.

From Elsig to Euskirchen the Medics pushed and pulled their vehicles almost all the way because the tanks and TDB had chewed the road so thoroughly.

When Lt. Knell Battalion Medical Administrative Officer was evacuated because of injuries received, Capt. Colwell, Battalion Medical Officer, went into Euskirchen'. He was told -by, an enlisted man that the town had Seen 'cleared through I the barracks . area so he went there with two enlisted men. The medics combed the battle field in the dark. Contact was established by means of fires at haystacks and the wounded men were brought to these points by T/5 B. E. Bowman. Some of the wounded men were badly in need of plasma and there was an urgent need for more than there was on hand. The Capt. did not know if the roads were open back to Nemmenich where the aid station was located. Pfc. Stella, a company aid man from CCA of the 9th Armored Division took a light tank and brought up 15 units of plasma to the barracks. Capt. Colwell stated that the plasma probably saved the lives of several of the men. Some of the wounded were then placed on three light tanks and two half-tracks and sent back to Nernmenich. There was a total of 41 casualties treated that night.

When morning came three ambulances were brought into Euskirchen to evacuate the wounded and operated from there two days and nights.

At 0100, Company I dispatched a 12 man combat patrol led by S/Sgt. Davis and S/Sgt. Spyker,, to reconnoiter a route for the advance of the company and attached armor an Roitzheim. The patrol received heavy fire from buildings and after unsuccessfully attempting to continue, returned at 0300. At 0400, the patrol was sent out again. The patrol went down the 3rd grade highway from Euskirchen to Roitzheim to reconnoiter it as a possible route for Co L's advance. The reported back that this road would not be suitable for the tanks since there was a large crater located at a point just before the 2nd grade highway crossed it. While on the mission the patrol was ambushed and pinned down by automatic weapons fire and sniper fire. One of the enemy threw grenades at the patrol from a second story window. Two men were -wounded but the patrol moved back and down the 1st grade highway running almost due south. The patrol found this route suitable for armored vehicles but warned the company that the Germans had dug in along the road during the night.

At 1100 Company I jumped off from Euskirchen with four light tanks, a platoon of medium tanks and two-tank destroyers. The company mission was that of seizing the town of Roitzheim and securing the bridge over the Erft River in the northwestern edge of the town in case it I was still usable. In, the event the bridge was not usable the company was to withdraw and assist in mopping up Euskirchen south of the railroad tracks.

Company I with the armored vehicles moved down the 1st grade highway to the crossroads where it turned due east toward Roitzheim. In the vicinity of the crossroads the Company received machine-gun and small arms fire from entrenchments in the area and from one anti-tank gun' firing from a position south. on the road This anti-tank gun was knocked out with 57 min gun from one of the light ranks. The Infantry fought with the tanks making a reconnaissance with fire. The attackers moved to a point some 200 -yards from the Erft Canal after killing an estimated 10 to 15 Germans on the way. At this point the Company and the armored vehicles stopped for twenty minutes waiting for a TOT which had been planned to be fired on Roitzheim. It was discovered finally that the TOT had been fired 30 minutes early. As soon as this was discovered the Company, together with the tanks and tank destroyers, moved out to seize the town and the bridge. The men came under considerable artillery and small arms fire from Roitzheim but pushed on.

When the Company got to the town the lead scouts found that the bridge. Had been destroyed. The small arms fire continued and, in addition Company I was now receiving very heavy artillery concentrations. The Company Commander, Capt. Olson reported to the Battalion Commander that the bridge was impassable and requested counter-battery fire and. smoke so that the Company would withdraw and continue with the mission that had been planned at Euskirchen. The Company was ordered instead to continue on and capture Roitzheim.

The advance of the Company was made very difficult as 'a result of several factors, the first of which was the terrain. About 150 yards west of the Canal was a ditch which had to be crossed. Next came the Canal with banks five to six feet high. The Ist platoon with the commanding officer moved into the stream in a line of skirmishers and crossed in rushes. The water came up to the necks of the men and since it was very cold they suffered considerably from shock.

There were concrete machine-gun emplacements north and south of the town and the men were fired on from all sides as they jumped the ditch, waded across the stream and crawled and ran from cover to cover. T/5 Carroll E. Pomplin, Company Aid Man, rushed from the canal to give aid to two wounded men. He was hit in the side after crawling about 20 yards, but continued until he was hit again. S/Sgt. Meadows, against the advice of his comrades, went to the aid of the medic and was mortally wounded.

The Company tried to find a place where the tanks could cross the stream but did not succeed. The 3rd platoon then crossed the Canal moving in rushes like the 1st platoon. The platoon crossed at a point south of where the 1st platoon crossed and the water there was found, to be knee deep.

Just after the 3rd platoon crossed the enemy counterattacked with 12 men first and then with 15 more. Company I's ammunition supply was down at this time to one clip per man. "We were really getting worried that was some tight spot", the Company Commander commented. By working through the Battalion Commanders radio the company succeeded in getting one tank to the rear and then back up to the bridge with ammunition.

The five medium and three light tanks and the two tank destroyers fired into the town in an effort to dislodge the enemy there from his positions. At this time a number of Germans could be seen moving up from Stotzheim and the Company Commander was convinced that he must try and get one of the tanks across the stream. Finally a suitable spot was found a little south of the spot where the 3rd platoon had crossed. By 1630 one of the tanks went across. The remainder followed in short order. The Company with the tanks then moved into the town and cleaned it out. In the fight for Roitzheim the mortar forward observer was wounded together with the leader of the platoon of heavy machine guns with fought in the town with Company I.
 

 
Picture: CLEARING OUT-EUSKIRCHEN

Company I took from 165 to 200 prisoners from the machine-gun emplacements. There were three SS Officers and several SS non-commissioned Officers in the group and it was learned that they had directed the Volkssturmers and other regular army personnel in the stubborn defense of the town. A woman was found in one of these emplacements where she had manned her weapon until she was killed. A total of 40 to 50 machine-guns were destroyed.

The enemy held on as long as it could and Company I had to kill a large number of the men in their positions. Two of the SS Captains thought they saw an opportunity to escape and started to run whereupon the tankers opened up and shot them both. The Germans fought hard to keep open the north-south highway to the east of Roitzheim. Another platoon of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers were brought across the Erft Canal and helped to defend the area during the night.

While Company I sweated it out at Roitzheim, Company L was engaged in the mission of clearing one-half of Euskirchen Capt. Barzelay pointed out that Euskirchen is a large city and that half of it was a rather large objective for one company. Town plans were issued the proceeding day while the Company was engaged in mopping up the barracks area. The Company moved out and a platoon of tanks and a platoon of Infantry leapfrogged from building to building. The Company Commander had planned the attack with the town divided into three parts. The company's radio would not work because of the buildings so the Company Commander pointed out the three sectors to those concerned. According to the plan there were three platoons, each of which was assigned two tanks and made responsible for a sector of the town.

The company had available a section of machine guns from Company M and another section from the Company's own weapons platoon. A section was given to each of the two flank platoons.

Since the radios would not work the Company Commander used a jeep for the purpose of control. He really sweated out the snipers as he rode down the streets with a map in his hand. About noon Capt. Barzelay contacted Capt. Owens, the Company K Commander, who said that his company had taken its sector.

That night Company L set up local security in its sector and two platoons were sent out to the roads to the southwest. Before these platoons arrived at their destination a scout from. the tank destroyer outfit reported that there were 200 men advancing from the south behind Company I's positions at Roitzheim. Company L then received the mission of setting up a defensive line to the south. Company K was also to move up. , Capt. Barzelay went out on reconnaissance to find defensive positions for the Company leaving the first sergeant in charge. The Captain had gone only a short time when Lt. Col. Lutz, the Battalion Commander, met the First Sergeant at the railroad tracks. He told the Sergeant that there was no counter-attack but that 60 men from Company M were moving up to Roitzheim. He instructed the First Sergeant to put outposts on the two roads leading south from Euskirchen. This was accomplished. During the course of the night one man was killed and two wounded by mortar fire on the western most of these outposts.

Company I at Roitzheim had cleared the town by 2130. The company set fire to half the town with white phosphorous grenades. The company heard the previously mentioned. rumor to the effect that the enemy was massing tanks and infantry at Stotzeheim.. The Battalion Commander set up a defense of Roitzheim on the south and east leaving the north and west open. Then at 2300 a report was received that 200 of the enemy were advancing on the town from a westerly direction. A platoon was then placed on the western edge of Roitzheim while elements of Company M manned two knocked out American tanks to the north.

When Lt. Col. Lutz heard the story of the counter-attack from the west he scratched his head and thought for a minute. Then he said, "Well what would the krauts be doing coming in from that side?" and went out on a reconnaissance with five men to see if the story was true.

The Colonel and the men did not find any counterattacking enemy. It developed that the rumor had been started by men from the tank destroyer unit who had seen a platoon from Company M moving up to join Company I at Roitzheim.

The men of the 3rd Battalion were alerted for any possible counter-attacks and little sleep was had all through the night. Company I had fought continuously for more than 30 hours with less than 8 hours sleep in 5 days.

The battalion marched to Kuchenheim and closed in at 1150 where the men were fed and given a few hours to clean equipment, themselves and get a few minutes rest. At 1800 the battalion was motorized and moved to Rheinbach, Where it closed in at 1900 and all units were billeted for the night.

At 0130 the battalion was given, the mission of passing through the 60th AIB which was dug in on high ground in the vicinity of Lantershofen and to seize the crossings over the Ahr River at Bad Neuenahr and Heimersheim. Information was received that the 60th AIB had advanced from Rheinbach to Lantershofen, a distance of about 10 miles, during the afternoon, and evening before, encountering practically no opposition and that the same could be expected from Lantershofen to the Rhine, about 10 miles away. The City of Bad Neuenahr was a hospital center and was reported to be an open city. By obtaining a few trucks and half tracks and mounting the remainder of the infantry on tanks and TD's it was possible to, motorize the battalion and to move to Lantershofen and continue the advance, motorized from that point. A hot meal was fed at 0300 and at 0335 the Battalion Commander gave the Company Commanders the movement and attack order.

Company K with 1 light, 1 medium tank platoon and 1 machine gun platoon of Company M attached, was to proceed down route 266, bypassing Bad Neuenahr to the south and seize the bridge at Heimersheim. Company L, with I platoon of medium tanks and 1 platoon of TDs attached, was to move to the south behind Company K and seize the bridge over the Ahr River at Bad Neuenahr. Company I was to follow Company L and be prepared to assist either Company K or Company L if necessary.

The battalion moved out in darkness and heavy fog at 0600 A and the leading elements of Company K had reached Lantershofen at 0800. As soon as they had passed the town, they came under small arms and artillery fire and direct fire from self-propelled guns which knocked out 2 leading tanks. A reconnaissance was made and it was found that the city, although marked by Red Crosses on the roofs of buildings, was heavily defended. The battalion was dismounted immediately and reconnaissance and plans were made for a coordinated attack to accomplish the mission previously assigned. Word was received that the battalion was to seize only the bridges in Bad Neuenahr and that the bridge at Heimersheim would be seized by another unit attacking from the North.

Fragmentary orders were issued at 1030 as follows: Company K with 1 Platoon of light tanks, 1 medium tank platoon and 1 section of MGs attached, would move out at once to the high ground north of Lantershofen, move down behind the ridge paralleling highway. 266 to a position 500 yards north of the eastern end of Bad Neuenahr, there to continue the advance on order, seizing the factory area between Bad Neuenahr and Heppingen, thereby cutting off the retreat of the enemy to the east. Company, L with 1 platoon of medium tanks and 1 platoon of TDs attached, to attack from the hill southeast of Lantershofen and seized the 4 bridges over the Ahr river. Company I to follow Company, L and mop up the town. 1st MG platoon, Company M to support the attack of Company L by fire from positions north of Lantershofen. Company L to attack on orders as soon as Company K was in position north of the factory at ' ea.

The machine gun platoon in battalion support was set up on a hill looking down into Bad Neuenahr to open fire on order. While at the observation point on the hill some Germans were observed moving up the road in a truck to remove an Anti-tank gun. The mortars followed the truck as it moved back down the road. Some of the Germans got Out and ran and effective fire was placed on them. Company K moved southeast from the- high ground southeast of Carweiler at 1100. Two tanks and 5 half-tracks were bogged down but a route was found and the remaining 3 medium and 3 light tanks were brought through. Following a 5 minute mortar and assault gun preparation, the company attacked. at 1435 and secured the north-east part of Bad Neuenahr against moderate opposition. Patrols contacted Company L in the town and secured the bridge on the Ahr River. Due to the number of small bridges across the River in Bad Neuenahr each was,, given -a number. Company K captured a Gestapo Headquarters that contained enough armament and equipment to equip a Regiment.

At 1330 Company L attacked from the hill southwest of Lantershofen. A-T fire from the, outskirts of Bad Neuenahr knocked out 3 tanks and the other armored vehicles were unable to continue over the rough terrain. The company entered the eastern outskirts of Ahrweiler on foot, secured bridge 1 and moving along the main street into Bad Neuenahr under persistent sniper fire, secured Bridge 2. Enemy -small arms fire prevented the crossing of the, bridges, but defenses were set up to prevent the enemy from destroying them.

Company I moved into town as planned behind Company L. At 1800 a 9-man patrol crossed bridge 3. It received a counter-attack almost immediately, and though driven back to the northern bank of the river prevented the, enemy from blowing the bridge.

When the rest of the platoon had moved up the bridge was re-crossed and heavy machine guns were set up on the south bank. A counter-attack at 0500 was driven off easily and the remainder of the enemy covering the south bank of the river withdrew. Cpl. Bilowich, Company I's transport corporal and driver was killed by artillery fire while bringing up a supply of ammunition.

At Bad Neuenahr the Medical section located a large hospital which they used as an aid station. In addition to the Germans, Capt. Colwell found one American PW from the 35th Division, one from the 4th Division, one Captain from the Air Corps, one Canadian pilot and three or four others. Arrangements were made for their evacuation. The Wounded men said they had received excellent treatment there. The Captain noted however, that there was only one German doctor and some enlisted men to act as a staff and that the hospital was lacking in equipment.

The battalion cleared the section of Bad Neuenahr south of the Ahr River and secured the high ground 'to the south which overlooked the city and route 266, the main, supply artery to the Remagen bridge. Roadblocks and outposts were set up, contact with adjacent units was established through patrols, and reconnaissance patrols were sent several miles to the south. Company K captured an enemy outpost manning a 75 mm A-T weapon which was placing direct fire on the highway leading to the bridge.

The battalion held defensive positions. Outposts were pulled in at 1300 when the battalion reverted to Regimental control and was alerted for a possible foot movement to Remagen.

At 2400 the battalion was ordered to move out on foot at 0100. It proceeded on foot to the Remagen bridge where it was met by the Regimental Commander Col. T. Hayes who ordered the battalion to assemble in Linz and await orders for further employment. The march over the heavily damaged bridge was made in darkness under intense artillery fire. The bridge was very weak and several vehicles had been lost through the gaping holes in the bridge just prior to the battalions crossing.

While the battalion was assembling in Linz, a small town south of the Remagen bridge, a strong enemy counter-attack had driven back a battalion of the 47th Infantry and reached a point 1500 yards from the river at the northeast edge of Ohlenberg. The 2nd Battalion of, the 310th Infantry was immediately deployed in the vicinity of Ohlenberg. Orders were received at 1100 to attack at 1330 from the vicinity of Kasbach and seize the high ground to the east. The seizure of this ground would eliminate an important enemy observation post and would cut off enemy forces which had attacked Ohlenberg. In order to avoid enemy observation and because no enemy information was available it was decided that the battalion would attack in a column of companies and would move along the southern fringe of the wooded area north of Ohlenberg. This necessitated a longer route over very rough terrain. The Company Commanders were assembled while troops were on the move into a forward assembly area just north of Kasbach. Fragmentary orders were issued as follows: Battalion attacks at 1330 from its present assembly area and seizes the high ground overlooking Ohlenberg. Formation: Column of companies L, K, I. Company L with I Mg Platoon attached advance along the fringe of the woods and seize the top of the hill. Company K to follow Company L at 200 yards, protect the south flank and seize the road junction immediately south of the high ground. Company I follow Company K, protect the north flank and set up defenses on the northwest side of the high ground. Wiremen were to follow the companies on foot and lay wire as they moved.

Jumping off at 1330, the column of companies, supported by HE and smoke from 81 mm mortars of Company M, advanced along the fringe of woods south of the railroad tracks. The enemy situation was unknown as was the exact nature of the objective which could only be determined roughly from the map. In addition to receiving extremely heavy artillery and moderate sniper fire throughout the advance, planes swooping up from attacks on. the bridge -strafed the battalion and a 500 pound bomb dropped by one of them knocked out an entire squad of the attacking platoon of Company L. Courage and a will to continue despite losses was prevalent throughout and Pfc. De Armend helped greatly in maintaining this degree of morale among the men with whom he fought.

The terrain was extremely difficult. Generally the advance had to be made single file and in several places a loss of foothold would have resulted in serious injury or death. Upon reaching the edge of the woods immediately west of the objective, Company L bore the full brunt of an artillery TOT which fell short of the objective and lost the major part a squad in its other attacking platoon. Despite the severe casualties Company L attacked at 1835 A, surprised 25 enemy, including 5 officer artillery observers, secured its objective and dug in on the southern and eastern portion of the objective. Company K set up defenses along the edge of the road just northeast of Ohlenberg. The 1st platoon made five attempts to place a roadblock but each time was driven back by tank and machine gun fire from concealed positions in a woods. Lt. Postlethwait, Ist Platoon leader, and Pfc. Creety were killed during one of these attempts.

Initially in reserve, Company I reached the woods immediately west of the battalion objective at dark without having had a chance to reconnoiter its attack route in daylight.

The company worked its way through extremely thick underbrush to a point half-way to the summit of the height in its zone. The 2nd platoon climbed to the summit where it set up defensive positions.- The 1st and 3rd platoons dug in on the slope to the left flank of the 2nd platoon. Positions were selected in darkness and troops dug in under heavy artillery fire. Four casualties were suffered.

The Battalion aid station was established in a brewery at St. Savernsburg. The aid men operated from this point and were subjected to constant fire while carrying the wounded to the aid station. The wounded men were carried by litter to the aid station and then evacuated by jeep.

On the forward slope of the high ground that Company I was occupying one of I Company's men was severely wounded. Even though this area was still under considerable fire, a litter squad was sent down. to try to evacuate him. As the men approached him they saw the Germans coming down on the side of another hill and were forced to leave. That night Pvt. William Rooney, an aid man with Company I, went down and treated the man. When he came back he got a volunteer litter squad to go back with him to evacuate the man. The Germans could see the squad as they evacuated the man but didn't fire on them. The man was brought back to the edge of the quarry for first aid and then was sent back to the aid station.

Under heavy artillery fire the area was searched and several prisoners were rounded up. At 1330 the enemy counter­attacked with 7 tanks and a battalion of Infantry.

The Ist platoon of Company I immediately moved to the summit on the 2nd platoon's right flank and after a fire fight drove back the enemy which had managed 'to break through between Company I and its 2nd platoon. At the same time elements of Company I on the far left flank knocked out an enemy machine gun crew as it was setting up its gun in an extremely threatening position. S/Sgt. Lambert and Pfc. William P. Lambert of Company I waited with bazooka until the approaching enemy tanks were less than 40 yards from them. They then scored 2 hits on each of the two lead tanks. The tanks were damaged only slightly, but upon receiving this fire turned around and retreated with the others toward Kretzhaus. When the Battalion Headquarters Company, which was ordered forward, to reinforce the defenses when the counter-attack started, arrived, the counter-, attack had been broken. Approximately 40 enemy had been killed and 20 taken prisoner. During the entire. Counter-attack, which lasted more than two hours, the 3rd-Battalion, was subjected to heavy artillery fire and direct fire from tanks, suffering 6 casualties. The battalion occupied and improved its defensive positions. Enemy artillery, fire inflicted 13 casualties. Instructions were received on the 14th of March that on 15 March, the battalion was to make a pie-dawn attack to seize the network of roads, the railroad and the high ground at the western end of Kalenborn. The enemy located in these positions had been holding up the advance of the 47th Infantry on the south and the 60th Infantry on the north for 2 days. Four attacks by the 2nd Battalion, 310th Infantry and the 52nd AIB were repulsed over a period of 3 days, each time forcing the attackers to withdraw.

The plan was for Company I with 1 platoon of tanks and I platoon of TD's attached, and supported by both machine gun platoons and the mortar platoon of Company M, to assault the enemy position at 0550, seizing the Kalenborn road, junction, securing the southern end of the railroad yards and to make contact with the 52nd AIB which was reported to be holding the northern end of the railroad yards and the road junction to the north. Company L was to follow Company I, protect the right flank and establish road blocks to the south. Because of the report that 6 enemy tanks were in the vicinity of the objective. 4 bazooka teams of the battalion A-T platoon were attached to Company I. These were instrumental in driving the tanks to the rear.

Company I and Company L moved north along Route 2 under heavy fire to Kretzhaus. From there they jumped off unsupported. The 2nd Platoon of Company, 1, led by Lt. I Hermann J. Carlson, crossed the railroad tracks at daylight and entered the woods immediately southeast of the road junction. Heavy artillery fire and 4 enemy tanks supported by infantry were encountered. Undeterred, the platoon held its position and fought back. They were so close to the tanks that two men were injured by the muzzle blasts. Continued bazooka hits, though only able to damage the tanks slightly,' finally forced them to withdraw, and the enemy Infantrymen retreated into houses along the west side of the road. The 2nd Platoon followed and cleaned out the houses, capturing 25 and killing 10 enemy. By 0900 the Ist and 3rd platoons converged at a road junction where bazookas were advantageously located and the platoons supported by a platoon of tanks, cleaned out. the railroad station and the dozen houses opposite it, capturing 8 snipers. At this time, heavy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire fell upon the area, wounding Lt. Cos. Lutz, Battalion, Commander, and Lt. Steele of I Company.

Meanwhile Company L dug in under heavy shelling on either side of the road below Kretzhaus and at 0830 cleared the portion of woods north east of the road junction Major General Louis A. Craig, in command of the ninth Division, made the Third Battalion responsible for the entire Kalenborn junction, regardless of what other troops were in the vicinity.

Company I with Company Q- 52nd AIB attached, attacked at 1430, and secured the remainder of Kalenborn junction. Company I suffered 12 casualties. The capture of this road junction and the high ground overlooking Kalenborn, after 4 unsuccessful attempts by other units, knocked out the last- enemy position with good observation on the Remagen bridge and cracked the enemy's last determined stand in that sector.
 
Kalenborn to Sieg River

At 1000 on the 16th of March the battalion was relieved by the 60th AIB. The men left the wooded hill-land around the Kalenborn junction and moved by truck to a reserve area northeast of Honnef.

It was a warm sunny day and for a while the men were free to enjoy it. The Diploma Blue CP was established in a roadside inn and the companies dug in along the side of the hill. There was a small pond beside the inn and some of the GIs supplemented their midday K Rations with fried trout. There was also a little Rhein wine from the abandoned inn's diminishing supply.

The rest period was sweet but it only lasted a few hours.

Early in the afternoon, the battalion was alerted again and moved out on foot with L Company in the lead. It was a grueling two-hour climb over a narrow winding road with sporadic artillery falling on the leading elements. The column reached the assembly area near Warenhof and Rottgen before dusk, and Company L moved up to relieve I Company of the 311th Infantry. The changeover was made at 1730.

Platoons of the 311th were dug in just below the summit of a large hill and the road leading up was subjected to heavy enemy shell fire. L Company had to climb through the fire and there were several casualties before it reached its objective.

The rifle platoons were placed in a semicircle covering three sides of the hill and Lieutenant Julian Miller, 4th platoon leader and acting company executive officer, led the headquarters personnel up to establish a company command post in a house on the summit. They had just moved up when the krauts threw in a heavy mortar barrage, cutting them off from the men who were dug in below the house.

It was dark by this time and the intensity of the shell fire made movement on the hill almost impossible. The company's radio operator was with the CP group but all attempts to contact him failed and it was assumed that his radio had been knocked out by the mortar barrage. Staff Sergeant Verne Peterson put an SCR 300 on his back and started up toward the house from the 3rd Platoon's positions. He climbed along the same route the CP group had followed. He was half-way there when he was halted by fire coming from the direction of the house. It was too dark to see but is was obvious by this time that the top of the hill was occupied by German soldiers, who evidently had infiltrated while L Company was taking over the positions from the 311th's Company 1. Peterson made another attempt to reach the house but was again stopped by small arms fire. He returned to his platoon to report what had happened. The company commander, who had been absent during this action, returned and reorganized the company's positions half-way up the hill. It was extremely dark and a heavy fog reduced visibility so much that it was deemed inadvisable to advance further that night. No word was received from the men who had moved up into the house. There were eighteen men missing including Lieutenants Miller and Blum, First Sergeant George Lynch, and Communications Sergeant Robert T. Bryan.

It was almost a skeleton company that waited through the night there on the side of the hill above Rottgen. The CP group was lost and the, platoons had suffered numerous casualties from the enemy shell-fire.
 

 
Picture: EAST END OF REMAGEN BRIDGE BEFORE COLLAPSE

Daylight finally came and at 0530 the remaining men of Company L started out to take the top of the hill. Lieutenant Mosely's platoon climbed straight up toward the house and received frontal fire from three machine-guns manned by an estimated fifteen men and supported by several dug-in enemy riflemen. While the ensuing fire-fight was in progress, another platoon moved along the side of the hill and came up on the enemy positions from the east flank. The Germans were trapped between the two platoons. Fifteen enemy were killed and fifteen taken prisoner.

The house was empty save for the web equipment and rifles of the missing men and it was learned later from the PWs that the eighteen men had been captured as they entered the house the night before.

I Company reported that 3 prisoners had been taken by a patrol sent out to contact friendly troops on their flank.

On the 18th of March the battalion was ordered to attack Heisterbacherott and the hill to the west of the town. The plan was for K Company to secure the southern end of the town and I Company to take the hill on the left as soon as Company K had completed its mission.

Supported by one TD and two tanks, K Company moved toward the town under cover of heavy woods. The approach followed a trail leading to the right of the town and the men intended to make their attack from the right flank.

At the edge of the woods they entered a shack and surprised twenty-six krauts eating breakfast there. The group surrendered without a fight and K Company moved on.

When the company reached a point in the woods directly opposite the town, it halted. The first platoon was left at the edge of a grove of scrub oak and the rest of the Company swung left to enter Heisterbacherott with the armor.

The men of the first platoon were spread out through the woods guarding what had become the company's left rear. Behind them were a section of machine guns and a section of mortars from M Company.

Staff Sergeant Paul T. King of M Company was the first to spot the Germans. They were coming down the trail through the woods and there were a lot of them. He set up his machine guns to cover and waited.

K's first platoon, under Sgt. Lang, was lying facing the Krauts but couldn't see them because of the density of the woods. The first sign of the enemy the men had was the sudden rattle of two machine guns that began throwing lead from the shadow of the trees directly to their front.

Sergeant King opened up then with his machine guns and Lang sent two BARs around through the woods to the left of his platoon. King directed the fire of his section with an M1 rifle and the BARs and machine-guns formed an effective cross-fire. 'The enemy advance was halted but the Germans were on higher ground than the men of K Company and they continued to throw a screen of lead which kept most of the first platoon pinned down.,

Lang and T-5 Joseph B. Zeigler were hugging the ground side by side when Lang decided to do something about the Krauts. He got up, yelling for his platoon to advance, and started walking into the German positions. In a matter of seconds, every man in the platoon was on his feet and moving up the slope. As they walked they fired and the woods shielding the attacking krauts were raked by a hail of 30 and 45 caliber slugs. They kept going for a hundred yards and the enemy fire began to decrease.

When the fight was over the GIs had captured twenty Germans and had killed between forty-five and fifty. There were dead Germans lying within six feet of the first platoons positions.

M Company had suffered three casualties and K Company, eleven.

S/Sgt. King received the silver star for his work that day and Sgt. Lang received a bronze star.

The Kraut attack had been broken up and those Germans that had not been captured or were not lying in the woods retreated back along the trail that divided K's sector from that of Company L.

The first platoon then joined the rest of K Company in clearing out its section of Heisterbacherott.

As soon as K accomplished its mission, I Company attacked the hill west of the town. There was a lot of resistance by small arms and automatic weapons but it was eliminated after ten Germans had been killed and fifteen captured. The hill was secured.

Meanwhile, Company L knocked out some resisting automatic weapons with counter-fire from machine-guns and M1s and cleared the woods on the battalions right flank. I Company then moved into the southern end of Heisterbacherott and K Company secured the northern part of the town.

The next day, the battalion received word that it was to move to Oberdollendorf.

Early on the 20th, the battalion marched into the town and assembled there ready to spend a restful night. Orders to move again came before dawn and the battalion marched out, of town after eating breakfast in the dark.

Holzlar was reached on the afternoon of the 2 1st and there the battalion became regimental reserve. Several men were sent to the rest center in Verviers, Belgium and all had an opportunity to rest their weary bodies, bathe, and write letters.

During the next few days the battalion reorganized. and considerable time was spent in the cleaning of equipment. 75 reinforcements were welcomed to the battalion on the 23rd and soon became an integral part of the Blue Infantrymen.

Orders were received on the 24th of March to move up and relieve the 2nd Battalion, 310th Infantry along the Sieg River. L Company moved upon the 25th followed by the rest of the battalion on the 26th. The mission assigned-to the battalion was to maintain defensive positions along the river and to keep close watch on the Germans, being ready to repulse any counterattack.

The next week the training program continued during the daytime and extensive patrolling was -conducted at night. Considerable enemy activity was observed but little aggressive action developed, Additional men were sent back to the rest centers and several men a day were afforded the' opportunity to take showers and procure clean clothes.

On the 3rd of April orders were received to prepare to be relieved on the following night. Blue Battalion was relieved during the hours of darkness on the 4th by elements of the Infantry Division and assembled in the town of Hangelar. Chow was served at 0400 the next morning and the battalion departed from Hangelar in trucks enroute to Betzdorf, Germany.
 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
6 April 1945

The morning was black, the moon was hidden and the dawn had not yet shown its face. Blue Battalion was assembled in the town of Betzdorf on the Sieg River, had been there all night and though little rest was available the men made the most of the few hours. As was customary, they had cooked their own fried potatoes and eggs the night before, ate their regular chow in addition, and in all, satisfied "ever growing" appetites. Equipment had been cleaned, some rested while others pulled guard, each man had his individual job to do and each was duty bound.

The Company Commanders had been on a reconnaissance the night before, had issued orders to all attachments, distributed overlays and possibly bowed their heads in a moment's sleep and a long prayer. At 0630, the 6 April 1945, the battalion once again began its relentless attack, against what was not just an enemy because the people represented upheld ideals and beliefs contrary to G. 1. Joe's, but because to each G. 1. had come a personal reaction. Perhaps his best buddy had been killed, his brother, his father or he himself had been wounded once or twice, maybe none of these. Perhaps he was just tired, tired of sleeping in dirty, wet, cold foxholes, tired of dragging, pushing, forcing himself onward day after day through mud, briars and water, tired of being shot at and wondering whether his was to do or die - or both. He was determined to end all this; to finish the fighting; to be able to think freely of the things he loved most; to sleep; to relieve his tired body and mind of all that had been torturing it for such a long time. That was the GI Joe who once again put his pack on his back, checked his ammunition, adjusted his helmet and with his faithful rifle groped his way into the darkness to form in the approach march with his buddies.

Company K was leading followed by L Company. Company I was in battalion reserve. The winding road from Betzdorf followed the Sieg River westward and as the men moved along the road to the line of departure near Kalteich the dawn was breaking. Company K with four tanks and one tank destroyer echeloned its platoons from terrain feature to terrain feature - or objective to objective. Kalteich, which consisted of only a few houses, fell without resistance to the Ist Platoon while the 2nd platoon of K Company advanced with Capt. Owens to the next small town, Elkhausen. The town of Kalteich was located on a bald hill affording the enemy good observation of all movement in the town. Troops from Companies I and M were also in the town with those of Company K and a good target was presented to the enemy. Artillery zeroed in on three houses where many of the men were congregated causing several casualties. Capt. James R. Bonner was mortally hit while reconnoitering in Kalteich to determine the best route to advance his company, Company I. Lt. Irving Ochs, Jr. assumed command of I Company at this time and led the company in the attack on the town of Hohnhahn. The town was small and there was little opposition. Having taken Hohnhahn Company I advanced to the town of Hecke and after capturing about 50 prisoners had cleared the town by 1015. Intermittent enemy artillery fire fell in the town a short while later but inflicted no casualties.

At Kalteich, where the enemy artillery was falling, it was only possible to move a few men out of the town at one time. Company K's remaining two platoons, less ten casualties, managed to get out of Kalteich and move on to join the 2nd platoon which had gone on ahead. Two platoons were then put on tanks and the third followed on foot. The town of Linden surrendered without resistance and approximately ten prisoners of war were taken. Company K, advancing next toward Wittershagen, was fired on from a draw to the east, however, they overcame the Germans and entered Wittershagen with little resistance from the enemy. An aid station was set up in one the houses near by and as the aid men would enter and leave the house with casualties the Germans would zero in with artillery.

K Company next moved to the west along the edge of a wooded area to escape from enemy observation. The lead tank lost a track at Wittershagen and then K Company set up a perimeter defense of the town. While there, the mortar observer sighted a machine gun nest and scored a direct hit on the enemy emplacement. As soon as all the men of K Company were together and the remaining tanks were brought forward the company reorganized and pushed on again to Stentenbach.

I Company which was receiving light artillery fire in Hecke moved out of that town along the right flank of the battalion zone to the high ground beyond. A little sniper fire and artillery fire was received but I Company moved on to the high ground. The Battalion Commander, Major Walter Pierce, then instructed I company to send a patrol to contact Company L.

Company I proceeded on order to the high ground near Diedershagen encountering no resistance as they advanced. Company L could be seen by Company I as they were fighting in the small town to the left of Diedershagen. The Germans however were not too desirous of resisting and surrendered willingly.

"Jerry", the name G. I's gave the German soldier, was on the run and the Blue Battalion intended to keep him moving. The leading platoon of Company K moved into Stentenbach with two tanks and, other than sniper, fire met no resistance. They then advanced into Stockshohe encountering a few enemy soldiers whom were found dead the next morning.

The remaining tanks threw their tracks in the mud and narrow roads and were unable to proceed to Stentenbach.

Company K had taken the last two towns for the day. Company I had organized in a defensive position to the right of Company K. Company L was echeloned to the left rear and had not been able to tie in with the rest of the battalion. The mortars -of TH Company were prepared to fire from positions to the rear of Company K and the heavy machine guns were used to assist in the defensive fire lines. The night was cold and dark. Chow was served at about 2300 hours after being transported to most units by hand carrying parties.

German soldiers were entering the battalion's lines that night and surrendering, rather than fight. It was learned from these men that several hundred German soldiers had been brought up in trucks that day to establish a defense for the highway which ran cast-west through Morsbach and to patrol the wooded areas south of the road so as to harass the Americans as they approached and delay their advance. However, the prisoners also stated that the Germans were not too desirous of fighting.

The situation the night of the 6th April was an uncomfortable one, both physically and mentally and every one waited eagerly, patiently, cautiously for the dawn of a new day.
 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
7 April 1945

At daybreak I Company sent a patrol down the dirt road to its left to contact K Company and bring chow forward. A group of infiltrating Germans were encountered and after a few were killed the rest surrendered.

Chow was distributed to all companies, prisoners taken during the preceding night were evacuated and ammunition was re-supplied by the Battalion Ammunition and Pioneer platoon, capably led by Lt. James Hilmar.

From the prisoners, who seemed almost eager to give information, it was learned that the Krauts had moved two companies into the area during the night and were planning to attack the ground occupied by Companies I and K. It was apparent that the Germans did not know that their objectives were held by American troops.

The influx of surrendering Germans continued during the day and all told the same story. There was a definite lack of organization in the enemy forces and small groups or individuals were found wandering aimlessly in the woods looking for a place to surrender. Though the GIs were glad to see the Germans giving up, it was hard to watch their enemies go back to the safety and relative comfort of a PW enclosure.

At 1555 hours the battalion was once more ready to attack. All three companies jumped off to the northeast as planned, with L Company heading for the little village of Alzen, I moving into Hofferhof, and K Company attempting to get control of the road between the towns of Morsbach and Steeg.

K Company's immediate objective consisted of two sections of high ground overlooking Wisser Bach which was a small creek that followed the road from Steeg to Morsbach. The two sparsely wooded knolls were separated by a dirt road that joined the highway less than a mile east of Morsbach. Two platoons were sent forward; one with the mission of taking the high ground to the right and setting up a road block on the highway, and the other with the mission of securing the high ground to the left.

Both platoons reached their objectives shortly after jumping off but while they were still digging in the enemy began throwing direct artillery fire from the front and right flank. In addition the GI's began receiving sporadic but effective machine gun fire. The concentration of enemy fire eventually made the exposed positions untenable, and word was sent back that it was inadvisable to try to hold the ground and would be better to pull back and consolidate the day's gains by forming a unified defense.

Meanwhile, L Company was moving north from K's left rear. The town of Alzen lay huddled in an open draw surrounded on three sides by thick woods. Heavy machine guns from M Company were set up, on the line of departure and the mortars began firing from a little farther back as targets presented themselves. The two forward observers had a clear view of the objective from an OP near the wood line about 350 yards from the town, and the softening up process began.

The first platoon had moved off on the left flank, and the second platoon was on the right with the light machine guns. The third platoon was in support.

The first counter action by the enemy came, as the scouts leading the first platoon were about halfway across the open area. A 20 mm gun began sending a stream of explosive shells into the fringe of woods and the first platoon was forced to double-time across the field and down into the town where it was engaged in a fire fight. It was either remain in the-deadly fire of the 20mm gun or close with the enemy.

The second platoon moved through direct 88 fire to the north end of town and set up a defense on the reverse slope with the light machine guns. By this time the first platoon had chased the Krauts out of its section of town and Capt. Barzelay had followed, in with his radio operator.

The support platoon cleared the woods to the east and southeast searching for the 20 mm gun but was unable to find it. Using one or two squads to a house the company cleared the buildings one by one and reassembled to set up the night's defenses.

The heavy machine-guns were placed by the machine-gun platoon leader in such a position as to take some of the pressure off K Company which had suffered heavy casualties before pulling back to a position out of the ring of relentless Kraut fire.

While K and L were fighting for their objectives, Company 1, on the battalion's right flank, ran into stiff opposition on the road to Steeg. Leaving the woods in the vicinity of Dietershagen, Lieutenant Ochs' men had moved down across a stream and into Hofferhof where only a little resistance was met in two of the houses. The town was quickly cleared and four German riflemen were captured.

At 1700 the company started off to the east with one of M Company's platoons trailing the column. The enemy intelligence section was, evidently not functioning as well as Lieutenant Janes' "I & R" men. On several occasions the company ran into Germans who thought the road still belonged to Deutschland. Two Krauts approaching on motorcycles were ambushed and killed, an another was taken alive when he came riding down the road on a bicycle. A little later a Volkswagen came up the road behind the column of American soldiers and the driver was killed.

The company had barely started moving again when still another German jeep approached from the rear. This one was carrying two captains and a lieutenant. One of I Company's bazooka men stopped the vehicle with a direct hit and there was a short exchange of small arms fire that ended with the death of one of the officers and the capture of the other two.

The first platoon, which had been leading the attack, moved off to the left to clear a group of buildings, and the second platoon moved on through. About 600 yards from Steeg the first squad had arrived at some houses on the right when two German tanks were spotted coming onto the highway.

Immediately, two bazooka teams took up firing positions in the ditch at the side of the road. There was a bend in the highway several hundred yards in front of the bazookas and the GIs in the ditch lay very still and waited. The wait was not long.

The first of the tanks lumbered into view and the long gun began to belch flame and high explosive. The bazookas opened up at the same time but the first round whistled down the middle of the road and missed. Another dark hulk rolled, up beside the first and both tanks directed their fire at the buildings that sheltered men of I's first and second platoons.

The red tile-roofed houses stood behind small trees that lined both sides of the road and the tank gunners began throwing shells at the trees. The shells ripped into the new spring foliage and exploded against the twisted branches sending hot shell fragments in all directions. A tree-burst is the most wicked type of artillery fire. GIs hugging the damp earth beside the houses had no protection from the descending fragments.

In an attempt to take some of the pressure off his men, Lieutenant Ochs brought the company's 60mm mortars into play. Within a matter of seconds the mortar men had zeroed in and were lobbing shells at the two tanks. The increase in fire forced the Germans to back up.

Enemy machine gun and sniper fire from the right flank had increased and casualties in the two groups of buildings had mounted to eight wounded and two killed.

The 60's began to run low on ammunition and were forced to lift their fire. The tanks started down the road again and gray-coated German Infantry could be seen coming over the rise of ground in front of Steeg. There were an estimated 130 enemy riflemen in the counter-attacking force.

Some of the second platoon got out from tinder the fire and moved into a creek bed on the left. The "536" radios had failed, but the company commander managed to get word out for his men to fall back to a hill southwest of the village and reorganize for another attempt.

The GIs had to cross 300 yards of open country through a hail of deadly fire from the "88's" and machine guns on the Kraut tanks, and two men were cut down by direct hits as they raced for cover in the woods on the other side of the field.

Most of the company got across to the high ground and permission was requested to return to the first objective taken that day.

When Company I moved back into the woods around Hammer to set up its defenses that night, the list of missing men was a large and bitter thing. Because of the heavy concentration of enemy fire, the company had been unable to evacuate its wounded. Others were cut off by the enemy counterattack and some never received word to leave town.

There were fifteen men, including the 4.2, mortar observer, who had been cut off but managed to keep contact by 300 radio. While trying to get back to the American lines, they sent patrols out from time to keep track of the enemy and radioed their location to battalion headquarters. The mortar observer even directed artillery fire by radio. It was three days before they found their company again and by that time they had picked up twenty prisoners. Twelve of the original 15 Americans returned safely.

That night, L Company found its town difficult to defend because of the numerous draws and depressions in the surrounding terrain. Light machine guns were set up on the high spots under the direction of 2nd Lt. Robert Hibbard who led a squad of his own up under heavy enemy mortar fire to establish a strong outpost. Wire was laid to him there and all night there was a protective ring of machine guns around the company area.

60 mm. mortars put in their usual overtime. During the long hours of darkness they fired half of their basic load, making the night as uncomfortable for the Krauts as possible.

The Battalion's 105s, under Captain M. L. Smith, FA, fired a few supporting rounds, and the only counter fire came from some enemy self-propelled artillery that was silenced between 0200 and 0300 hours.

When I Company's soldiers moved back to dig in for the night, they discovered Germans in the positions they had taken the evening before. At 2300, twenty-three prisoners were taken and more came strolling in at intervals throughout the night.

As darkness thickened into deep night on the 7th of April 1945, there were several hundred American men scattered through the wooded hill-land southwest of the German village of Steeg. For a few, the night had brought peace, forever. But for the living the night was to be only another long wait for the new day. A new day and a new list of dead and wounded and missing.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
8 April 1945

Shortly after dawn, I Company jumped off again, moving over the same ground they had covered the day before and picking up prisoners as they went. It was a crisp cool morning and the freshness of the air helped clean the haze out of the fogged minds of the tired GIs as they marched down the slope toward Steeg. The company column swung left before reaching Steeg and began moving northwest.

A patrol was sent off to the left flank and found 13 unarmed Germans and about 150 Russian and Polish slave-laborers. A little later, engineers, coming up behind the company to establish a two-way road chain, ran into a dozen Germans who had slipped into a farmhouse after the company had moved through. Two were killed and the others took off on the run toward Steeg.

The advancing GIs passed newly laid German communication wire and cut it before the Wehrmacht ever got a chance to use it.

While Item's first and third platoons were nearing their objective to the northwest, Company L moved out of Alzen to meet three tanks and a tank destroyer that had been released by K Company. When the armor arrived a half-hour later, L Company advanced into the wooded hills overlooking Morsbach and waited there for orders to attack. As usual the troops had dug in and were partially protected from the intermittent enemy shellfire.

Morsbach lay clustered around the road junction in a triangular hollow below L Company's position. The forward observers moved up to high spots along the edge of the forest and began to pick out targets. In a few minutes M Company's mortars and the 903rd FA'S 105 howitzers were blasting holes in the town.

An enemy tank was spotted and its location relayed to the TD commander. He brought his Tank Destroyer up with only the barrel of the gun pointing out of the green shadow of the trees. Eight rounds were fired and five connected. The tank began to burn and the Jerries hauled it away under cover of a smoke screen. Later in the day the knocked-out tank was captured about 580 yards south of Ober Warnsbach. The Germans had salvaged the ammunition and destroyed the gun.

Orders finally came for Company L to attack and the riflemen started down the slope toward town with M Company's mortars and heavy machine guns covering their advance from fixed positions. The second platoon, with light machine guns attached, moved under cover of the woods to the road junction. The trees were so dense as to make observation impossible and a two-wire team went with the platoon for communications.

The third platoon climbed onto the three tanks and the TD and traveled down the road to hit the enemy from the west flank in a coordinated push with the second platoon. They moved through Lt. Hibbard's men, dismounted at the road junction, and began clearing the houses one by one.

Contact between platoons was maintained by "536" radio. The second platoon was clearing the high ground on the West Side of town. It ran into two buildings filled with Germans and there was a short but vicious exchange of fire in which the GIs used bazookas, rifle grenades and mortars as well as small arms. Ten Germans were killed and ten captured.

With Morsbach cleared, the company climbed into the hills north of town and began the approach march on Birzel. The armor had to crawl up a narrow dirt road and one squad went with it as protection. The second platoon was traveling on the left side of the road with the other two clearing the high ground on the right.

Contact with the enemy came just before the lead scouts reached Birzel. The advance was held up while mortars and artillery threw shells over the GIs' heads into' the German positions.

Engineers had come up behind the infantry to get the road in shape for use as a supply route. They discovered German plastic mines in front of the company and dug out eight of them so that the advance could continue.

There was a house filled with German soldiers a few hundred yards from town and the tanks opened up on it. Krauts could be seen scurrying out of the house and diving for cover. The tanks held their fire while Company L's riflemen stormed into the house and killed a few Germans who had stayed behind.

Heavy fire, from the woods behind the house forced the GIs to get out and the Germans returned.

Again the Blue Infantrymen poured bazooka and machine gun fire into the rapidly deteriorating building and regained it this time for keeps. The Germans had enough. White flags appeared and about a hundred prisoners were taken.

The 4.2 and 81-mm mortars then laid a terrific barrage into the town itself and 180 more Krauts came out with their hands in the air. The little village of Birzel was now in American hands.

As the company moved into town, and artillery liaison plane swooped in low, dipping its wings. It circled back and the pilot dropped a note saying there were two Germans tanks 1500 yards to the north and that one of them was apparently disabled. The pilot's information proved to be completely accurate.

The second platoon led the advance on Ober Warnsbach while Captain Barzelay and the rest of the company remained in the woods. The disabled German tank was found by the GIs just before they reached the town.

Resistance in Ober Warnsbach was light. Seven PWs were taken and the entire company moved in with orders to dig in and hold.

Company K had waited until Company L crossed the Auburn phase line at Morsbach before beginning its attack. Up to that time, K's CP was used as an observation post for directing mortar and artillery fire on possible enemy strong points and on actual German traffic around the autobahn.

When the jump-off came at 1650, the company was without its armor and moved out on, foot. They left Stentenbach once more and cleared the woods to the northeast. German patrols had been reported in the area but none were contacted.

The first mission, establishment of a road block on the Steeg-Morsbach highway, was accomplished under fire. Two Germans were killed and eleven captured.

Machine-guns, riflemen, and one anti-tank gun were left at the road block and the remainder of the company followed the first platoon into Wasser. There was some resisting machine-gun and semi-automatic fire as the company passed through and the first platoon stayed behind to clean up the place while the others infiltrated into Steeg under cover of darkness.

The platoon in Wasser suffered a few casualties before silencing the enemy weapons but accomplished its mission and remained there until ordered to rejoin the rest of K Company. The few scattered houses designated on the map as the town of Hammer offered little resistance. While going through the buildings, the GIs found wounded soldiers who had been left behind when Company I was driven back the day before. The Germans had given them neither trouble nor assistance.

One GI had had a leg shot off and was treated by the Germans and left to die. For 16 hours, he lay in the farmhouse keeping himself alive by pure guts until K Company picked him up.

A squad was placed in Hammer to maintain a road block, and the force that had established the other road block earlier in the day came up the main road on foot to rejoin the main body of the company in Steeg. Tanks which had joined Company K at Wasser followed along behind the foot troops.

It was quite dark by this time and Steeg was not actually cleared of Germans until the following morning. A perimeter defense was set up and the GIs sweated out the night, getting what sleep they could while cautiously awaiting the dawn.

I Company, in Ober Warnsbach, had sent a patrol back to contact the 309th's G Company in Morsbach. Contact was made and Lt. Wright of the 309th returned with the patrol. Shortly after dusk, Lieutenant Ochs, leading I Company in its advance to the northwest contacted Captain Barzelay, and informed him that Company I was going to move through the town. At 2210 the company came walking in and stopped just long enough to have chow before proceeding on to Kappenstein. There were supposed to be enemy tanks between Ober Warnsbach and Kappenstein so one tank and one TD left L and followed I Company up the road. However, the armor was blocked by another vehicle and the infantry had to continue alone.

The night was dark and eight of the enemy stumbled through the company's lines and were captured by the second platoon which was spread out through the'w6ods flanking the road on either side.

A lone German sentry tried to stop the company's advance about 25 yards from the first building in Kappenstein. He was killed.

Immediately, the silent darkness was shattered by the sharp popping of small arms fire as the Krauts opened up from houses on both side of the road. The company advanced into the fire and took fifty prisoners of whom a dozen were officers.

The Krauts had plenty of weapons and ammo but were caught napping, and I Company took the town with only one casualty.

The third day in the Ruhr Pocket ended with the situation much brighter than it had been the night before. The battalion had covered a lot of ground with casualties relatively light, and the Jerries were being driven back toward the center of the pocket where they would be forced to surrender or be completely wiped out by the American troops that were relentlessly closing in from all sides.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
9 April 1945

When the first gray streaks of dawn drifted into Steeg from the east, K Company awoke to find itself practically bedded down with the enemy. Intense sniper and machine-gun fire greeted every movement the GIs made.

Lt. Axel E. Sahlin, who had received a field commission only three days before, went up into the barn being used as an observation post to try to locate the snipers. As he stepped in front of the loft window there was the sharp crack of a German rifle and the Third Battalion lost one of its best men.

Another man was hit in the leg and had to be evacuated. The Krauts were causing too much trouble. Captain Owens, Company C. 0., ordered the tanks to fire into the fringe of woods where most of the enemy fire was originating. The thick groves of fir and birch were raked by fire from the tanks' 76 mm guns and 50 caliber machine-guns and by fire from K Company's bazookas and machine-guns.

Air enemy machine-guns position was spotted by a GI who notified his squad leader. In a few moments the squad's bazooka team blasted the nest and two of the Krauts who had been manning the gun were killed.

The company occupied the entire morning cleaning the last snipers out of the town.

Up in the hills around Kappensicin, where Company I had spent the night, the morning was very quiet.

At 1000, Company L of the 311th came marching into town and relieved Lieutenant Ochs' men, who walked out of town and through what the 311th said were the enemy lines back to Morsbach, where the Third Battalion CP was located. The march was unhampered by contact with Kraut infantry.

When they reached Morsbach they formed in a march column with L Company and part of battalion headquarters and moved to a new assembly area at Solbach. The column marched up the same old highway through Steeg and was fired on by snipers and machine-guns as it passed K Company's right flank. Two platoons of I Company got past the road junction before the fire became so severe that it held up the rest of the column. Item's first two platoons swung back to protect the battalion’s flank while King Company's second platoon went out to clear the woods in which the by-passed Krauts were hiding. The GIs returned with forty prisoners, and the column moved out again with K Company and the forty Germans marching along behind.

The new assembly area was a peaceful stretch of woods and meadows and the battalion spread out to wait for new orders. By this time it was afternoon and the sun was shining bright and warm.

The forty prisoners were herded into a little shack. One had received a nasty bullet wound from the rear and he was treated by Pfc. Mike Harkovi, medic runner with the battalion CP group.

That afternoon, the commanders of the companies and of the attached TDs and tanks met in the battalion command post which was a slightly damaged farmhouse on' the side - of a muddy hill. There they received their orders and the battalion moved out, still on foot, to Hohenhain.

A new battalion CP was set up at 1920 on the hill overlooking Hohenhain in a German post office. The rest of the outfit established defensive positions and settled down once more to wait out the night.

Armored units of the 5th German Panzer Division were reported massing on the highway to the north and a counter attack was expected. The battalion was ordered to hold its position until Corps sent word to attack.

Even with the threat of counter attack hovering in the blackness, the night was the most restful since the battalion left Betzdorf.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
10 April 1945

The orders from Corps were not long in coming. The counter-attack failed to materialize and at 0800 on the 10th Battalion pushed off through the morning toward the little villages north and west of Hohenhain.

Company L, with the second platoon in the lead and mounted on three tanks and a tank destroyer, smashed into Romershagen and stopped only long enough to pick up a hundred prisoners before continuing on toward Doringen.

Company I reached its first objective, a little place called Rothenborn, without meeting resistance and, during the advance, captured a kraut tank and crew without a shot being fired. The only trouble was caused by the sloppy terrain. There were two tanks and two TDs attached to the company; however, one of the TDs foundered in the mud and was unable to advance with the infantrymen.

Company K had started out in reserve but was soon fighting its way into Dornscheid on the battalion's right flank. The first and third platoons took the town while the second cleaned out a 2000-yard stretch of woodland. When members of the second platoon joined the rest of the company in Dornscheid, they brought with them twenty-seven Germans.

L Company's attacking platoon took twenty PWs on the way to Doringen and ten more after it got there. The stream of Germans marching down the road away from the war was already growing into a sizeable river and the Third Battalion was advancing steadily with increasing momentum.

A little enemy artillery greeted Company L just outside of Doringen but there was no damage except to the scenery and the GIs had little time to enjoy scenery anyway.

A column of about thirty Germans tried to march over an open field in plain view of the company's tanks. The tanks let loose and twenty'-nine kraut soldiers were either killed or seriously wounded. While L Company's second platoon moved into Doringen the rest of the company remained in the woods and contact was maintained by SCR 300 radio.

In Rothenborn, I Company's first and second platoons set up defensive positions in front of the town. Three German tanks were spotted to the right front in the town of. Rothemuhle. The company called for TDs but they had been assigned to another company and were not available.

After waiting around to see if any trouble would develop with the enemy tanks the first platoon moved over and secured the road junction at the entrance to the town. The second and third platoons climbed to the high ground overlooking the village from the southeast where they could see that the Jerries were beginning to slip out the back way.

Captain Smith, acting as liaison for the battalion's supporting artillery directed heavy fire onto a German motor column that was attempting to withdraw, and everyone on the hill could see that the enemy was beginning to crack. The Krauts were leaving equipment ranging from knapsacks to horse-drawn artillery in the wild scramble to get away.

Company I captured Rothemuhle at 1500'and cleaned out Vahlberg, Brun, and Wendenerhutte in rapid succession. There were road blocks at each of these towns but the civilian villagers were told to dismantle them and did so almost eagerly. The German civilian population, such as it was after being depleted to fill the ranks of the rapidly disintegrating Wehrmacht, was at last beginning to realize the overwhelming strength of the forces that opposed Deutschland. After K Company had taken Dornscheid, Captain Owens sent patrols to the high ground on both sides of Ottfingen. With the town completely outflanked, the company moved in and established road blocks. At 1500 Company K jumped off again, capturing two SP guns and moving forward without resistance.

Over on the battalion's left flank, L Company was smashing on toward its next objective. The town of Heid hugged the side of the hill just across the valley from positions where. Lieutenant Applegate, of M Company, had set up his, observation post. The lieutenant had a beautiful view of the village and his 8 1-mm mortars began lobbing in shells.

L Company's second platoon was still leading the attack with, the armor. They rolled down out of the woods to- the railroad track where the tanks were stopped by a low underpass. With their passage blocked on the road, the tanks tried to ford the stream that paralleled the railway. One of them bogged down in the soft bottom and the others had to maneuver 900 yards south before they could get across.

The light machine-gun section moved in on foot behind the second platoon and by the time the leading elements reached the village it was quiet and empty, The enemy soldiers had slipped away into the woods behind the town.

When the TD fired a few rounds into their hiding place, fifty Germans came out yelling "Kamerad". The TD then moved up along the railroad tracks and knocked out a Jerry tank.

The second platoon dug in to the company's right front while the third moved up on the left. The positions were on high ground and offered excellent observation of the entire front for a distance of over three thousand yards. Retreating enemy foot troops and horse-drawn artillery could be seen moving into the woods to the northwest. There was no contact with the artillery at the time so, the company threw out as much mortar fire as possible and the TDs fired their go mm guns. The combination proved rather effective and the German lost heavily in troops, material, and horses.

Heide was now officially added to the list of conquered towns and the company climbed onto half-tracks and rolled forward into Bilchen still without overtaking the enemy. While in Bilchen, the company was shelled by German self-propelled guns and a few men were wounded.

Although the day was swiftly dragging on into night, there was still time to take a few more towns, and the GIs' once more mounted the half-tracks and rolled off across the German countryside.

Halbhusten was entered at dusk, but the half-tracks rumbled on until they reached Husten. While the company was being oriented, ten more Germans were captured.

I Company had left the empty village of Wendenerhutte and started out toward its next objective which was Hillmicke. The road was effectively zeroed in by kraut artillery and the company had to advance through heavy shell-fire. Hillmicke was evidently a hot spot.

Sniper fire caused several casualties and the GIs holed up in some buildings in front of the town where there was a railroad underpass and some large military barracks. Company headquarters stayed -on the left side of the left side of the railroad tracks while the rest of the company crossed over. As the second platoon tried to move into the buildings, it received German, mortar fire.

Twenty-two men of the second platoon were wounded and one was killed before the company could reach cover.

Lieutenant Ochs was unable to locate the mortars. They could have been firing from the town or from the high ground that surrounded his company's positions.

The GIs were very uncomfortable that night. An infiltrating enemy patrol killed one of the company's sentries and wounded another. The wires between platoon and company headquarters were cut in to places presumably by the same patrol.

L Company's location was also rather precarious. Captain Barzelay's men had moved so deep into the enemy lines that they were almost completely isolated from other friendly troops. It was too dark to do much about clearing Husten so the men established a perimeter defense and held tight.

A patrol led by Staff Sergeant Eloroy Runyon of the third platoon was sent to the nearby village of Tillkhausen. The patrol took the town with no trouble at all and returned with, seven prisoners.

Maintenance of supply contact proved rather difficult during the night. Two wire jeeps from battalion headquarters and the company's chow jeep were I ambushed on their way up to L Company's location.

They were travelling blacked out over the little road leading from Hahn to Husten when; the Kraut weapons opened up right in front of them. The jeeps stopped and everyone dove for cover everyone, that is, except T/Sgt. Frank Maker and Pfc. Kenneth Armstrong.

Armstrong manning the machine gun on the chow jeep was hit in the chest by one of the first bursts of fire. Maker took over and fired an entire box of ammunition into the attacking Germans. Five of the enemy were killed and ten, surrendered. The rest of them decided they had ambushed the wrong jeeps and ran off into the darkness.

Armstrong was seriously wounded so aid-man T/5 Justus Luzader moved him to a nearby house and stayed with him till dawn. Two riflemen remained in the house as protection against wandering German soldiers, and battalion wire men laid a line to the house so the men would be able to call for help if any trouble developed. The jeeps went on to complete their mission and the wounded man was picked up the next day.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
11 April 1945
 
Early in the morning, before leaving Husten, Company L captured 150 German soldiers who had been hanging around the town all night. The main body of the company then moved out through Tillkhausen while Lieutenant Sweezy's platoon was out on a separate mission.

At 0550, I Company left its positions just outside of Hillmicke and began clearing the big hill south of the town. At 0800, the company walked into town to find that all but fifteen of the Germans had left during the night. The fifteen surrendered without resistance. The GIs also found an enemy ambulance loaded with weapons ranging from Lugers to machine guns.

Company K jumped off that morning at 0930 and cleared some more of the woodland north of Ottfingen. With this accomplished the men mounted jeeps, half-tracks and tanks, and swept through the towns of Benolpe, Gerlingen, and Brucken, taking several hundred prisoners and releasing one First Division infantryman who had been captured by the enemy.

At Brucken, Captain Owens received orders to move west to Wiedenest to prevent the withdrawal of several thousand enemy troops from the rapidly diminishing pocket. The first platoon, led by Ist Lt. John H. Higgins, took off first and entered Wiedenest in early afternoon.

The only threat in the town was a SP gun along the highway. The TD moved up and quickly knocked the gun out, allowing K Company to capture the town and 150 enemy soldiers.

At midday, Battalion Headquarters piled into jeeps and trucks and left Hahn for the hills to the north. The long convoy raced over the twisted roads at top speed, moving so fast that the jeeps became strung out in a line a mile long.

One enemy soldier was encountered on the way. He was standing by the side of the road with his family gathered about him and they were all watching the American jeeps go by. He was trying to get someone to stop and capture him, but the GIs were in too much of a hurry to give him a second look. His family had come along to see him off and say "auf wiedersehen" and now they were being disappointed. They stood there with puzzled, unhappy expressions on their faces until the last jeep had gone by.

About five miles from its destination, the convoy passed a group of several hundred liberated Ukrainian slave-laborers. They were gathered in a field just off the highway and it looked like a community outing. A few of them had guitars and accordions and they played while the others sat on the sunlit grass -singing songs of their homeland in beautiful happy harmony.

As the jeeps swept down through the forest into Wliedenest, they went through a kraut prison camp. Italians and French lined the road and cheered and clapped their hands and shouted greetings as each jeep-load of GIs went by.

It left a strange, warm feeling inside and made the war seem perhaps not so bad after all. A battalion command post was established in Wiedenest in late afternoon and all companies assembled there.

At 1715, I Company moved up the highway northeast from Wiedenest and took the town of Pernze. Anti-tank guns were placed at the road junction there to protect the battalion's flank in the event that a concentration of enemy troops should appear in the area.

I Company held its positions in Pernze through the night, sending a patrol out at 0100 to contact elements of the 8th Infantry Division. The 8th sent a rifle company down from the north on tanks to open the road into Pernze.

Company K left Wiedenest at 1900 and had set up a defense in Nieder Rengse by nightfall.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
12 April 1945

The pocket was crumbling rapidly. By morning of the twelfth, which was the battalion's seventh day in the pocket, all organized enemy forces were withdrawing toward the center of the industrial Ruhr, presumably to make a last ditch stand and pray for a miracle.

Company I moved out first. They left Pernze on trucks and passed through K Company's positions in Nieder Rengse. On the way through Lieberhausen, they picked up twenty-four PWs and kept right on going.

A sort of leapfrog system was used. A platoon would drive into a town and start cleaning it up while the next platoon swept on through to the next village. As soon as the first platoon finished, it would move through the other one and enter still another town.

At Krepplenberg the company captured thirty-three SS troops. Four were officers. Some of the German enlisted men were surprised while in a barn still operating their radio.

As it moved north, I Company spotted some unidentified tanks moving down from the north. Thinking they were enemy, the men dove for cover in the woods and took defensive positions. As the lead tank rounded the curve in the road, a bazooka team fired one round and then discovered that the tanks belonged to the American 8th Division. Luckily, the rocket missed.

Meanwhile L Company had taken Driebershausen and 200 prisoners. K Company was in reserve all morning.

In early afternoon, the entire battalion moved to a general assembly area in Dannenburg, which was about ten miles northwest of Wiedenest. There, all men were mounted on tanks, tank destroyers, jeeps, half-tracks, anti-aircraft vehicles or trucks and the battalion left in a long convoy at 1600

The convoy moved slowly along the highway over high fields and the night came drifting in, cold and wet. At dusk, the vehicles stopped in the rain just outside of Marienheide and the men ate hot chow. It was almost dark when they mounted up and moved off again. Anti-aircraft crews had set up their guns along the highway on the outskirts of Marienheide not as protection against the Luftwaffe because there was none. The ack-ack guns were aimed down the road in positions to forestall any possible chance of an enemy breakthrough, and they looked like formidable anti-tank guns.

The battalion moved on to within a few miles of Wiperfürth and set up positions in the dark.

Company I cleared Listringhausen and three other small, closely bunched villages that night. There was no resistance and twelve prisoners, including two majors and a lieutenant, were captured. At 02000, a Jerry infantry colonel stumbled through the darkness to one of the company's machine-guns and gave himself up.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
13 April 1945

The Germans had retreated from Wipperfürth by dawn, but the Third Battalion's advance was held up until afternoon by corps order.

While the other companies sat tight and waited for permission to cross the phase-line west of Wipperfürth, K Company moved out and cleared the high ground around the town. Patrols were sent down into the village itself to reconnoiter and they returned to inform Captain Owens that the Krauts had left. One platoon moved in. and occupied a sector of the town until orders came through for the battalion to attack.

Late that afternoon, I Company climbed on trucks and started out. After the third platoon cleared Jestberg and Kleineichen, the entire Company fell in behind L Company in the approach march to Hilckeswagen.

Hilckeswagen was the largest single objective the battalion had been given in the Ruhr Pocket. It was a small manufacturing city straddling the hills at a bend in the Wupper River.

L Company reached the outskirts at dark and was met by the Burgomaster and several other citizens of the town. They came out carrying a white flag and spouting polite words of greeting.

"Come on in," they said, "we don't want to fight. All the soldiers have left and we hereby surrender our town to you.'

The speech was good and it was convincing.

L Company accepted the surrender and the column of infantry and tanks began moving down the main street between the rows of large buildings. The night was dark and everything was very peaceful.

The column had moved maybe a hundred yards into town when the Krauts opened up from the deep shadows of windows and doorways with everything they had.

The lead tank was knocked out by German bazookas and the infantry swarmed off the main drag into the buildings, firing as they ran. The fighting moved quickly through the town. Lieutenants Sweezy and Applegate, with the third platoon, battered down the doors of one building and found eight enemy soldiers. Five of them were killed and three were taken as PWs.

The first platoon swung up onto the high ground to the east and began driving the enemy down toward the center of town. The platoon took thirty prisoners, jammed them into one building, and went on with the work of clearing the rest of their section.

Sergeant John Babcock set up his section's 60-mm mortars, and shells began blasting the kraut positions. The fighting continued until enemy resistance was completely broken shortly, after midnight. Germans were encountered occasionally after that but most of them surrendered willingly and the battalion's PW bag was overflowing.

When it was all over, L Company was scattered through town and the darkness made reorganization very difficult. There were still houses to clear and defenses to be established, and of course there were the casualties. The TD commander had been killed when his TD was knocked out and the company itself had lost a large number in wounded and killed.

While L Company was getting reorganized, I and K Companies moved in and cleared the sectors to which they had been assigned, and a Battalion CP was set up in the offices of a factory at the entrance to the town.

All had quieted down by 0300 and there was time for a few of the men to get a little rest before daylight.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
14 April 1945

Morning found Hilckeswagen seething with activity. Germans had been surrendering all night and the highway leading out of town was jammed with PWs going back and American troops coming up.

The GIs were advancing so rapidly that the town was frontline in the morning and rear echelon in the afternoon. The PW Collecting Point was moved up at noon and long column of PWs that had marched down the highway out of Hilckeswagen were forced to turn around and march back into the town.

Elements from all three battalions moved into Hilckeswagen that day and a regimental CP was set up in the town in early afternoon.

The factory housing the battalion CP stood in front of a large German ammo dump just before the companies left, two kraut artillery shells hit the dump and set it afire. The ammunition began to explode and hot shrapnel was falling all over the east end of town, knocking holes in the buildings and scaring the wits out of the civilians who thought the war had returned.

M Company's vehicles had used the ammunition dump as shelter and when the place began to blow Lip T/Sgt. William Boucher and Corporal Grover P. Bivin volunteered to evacuate the jeeps and trucks. They worked fast, moving through the falling shrapnel and were able to get the vehicles to safety. Not a single jeep was scratched.

Shells and rockets were still exploding when Captain John Masterpole, Hq, Co. Commander organized the Battalion's CP group into a march unit and led them to the west end of Hiickeswagen where they were out of the radius of the falling metal.

The town was left behind at about 1400 and the battalion marched along the highway in a column of companies with Headquarters trailing. The men could see German artillery falling up ahead on their destination. A report came back from the intelligence section that the battalion's proposed assembly area was under heavy artillery fire and the companies were held up in Krowinklerbrucke.

There was a lot of reconnaissance activity in the evening and it was plain that the fighting in the Ruhr Pocket was almost over. The Germans had been compressed into a small area and were surrendering in wholesale lots.

The companies got some sleep that night. It was probably their first real opportunity to rest since Blue Battalion jumped off from Betzdorf on the upper Sieg River on The 6th of April.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
15 April 1945

The pocket was almost wiped out and still the enemy had shown no desire to make a stand and fight to the finish. The Germans had given battle all the way but it was a retreating battle, and resistance was never up to expectation. They had the weapons and the ammunition, and they always had enough observation to derange the battalion's troop movements -- but never was the artillery harassment as severe as it had been on the other side of the Rhine.

The enemy troops in the Ruhr Pocket were mostly old men and young boys. The old men had no desire to die for what was obviously a hopeless cause and the young boys were just too green. Besides, the Krauts were beaten and they knew it.

Early on the morning of the 15th, the entire battalion left Krowinklerbrucke with the companies fanning out as they neared the first of the day's objectives. K Company was in the lead with I staggered to the left rear. L moved along behind K and mopped up. The objectives were numbered on all the commanders' maps --- numbers were easier to handle than the names Germans gave their towns and as the companies advanced they radioed the number of each objective as they took it.

The numbers came in swiftly.

K Company moved west to clear a small village on the outskirts of Lennep. Intermittent mortar fire was received all the way into the town but ceased once the objective was taken. The Company then swung north and moved swiftly through several towns until it reached Bevenburg, on the Wupper River three miles southeast of Wuppertal. The enemy garrison commander surrendered the town to Lieutenant Robert Durk, then K Company's Commanding Officer.

All bridges across the Wupper River had been blasted and the company's advance was held up temporarily.

Meanwhile, I Company came up to the left of K Company. Motorized patrols, mounted on half-tracks belonging to the 552nd Armored Anti-aircraft Battalion, were driving from town to town while the rest of the company took its objectives the harder, way on foot.

At Weffelpuft, the company was met by a German captain who surrendered himself and his entire company of over a hundred and eight men. The Germans had been dug in with machine guns and mortars and could have held out for twenty-four hours, but they preferred to live.

In Herbringhausen, forty more prisoners were taken and I Company set out for the large Manufacturing city of Wuppertal.

Although officially in reserve, Company L had captured over a hundred prisoners before it reached the Wupper River at Bevenburg. The company crossed the river on foot using ladders on the bombed out bridges and took Ehrenburg and the high ground overlooking Wuppertal without firing a shot. Twenty-five Germans were captured as the GIs entered the town and a German first sergeant later surrendered his company to Captain Barzelay. I Company's foot troops were the first to reach Wuppertal. They had crossed the stream and marched on down the highway while the mounted elements were looking for a place to get their vehicles across. They stopped in the outskirts of the city and were joined later by the vehicles.

K Company forded the stream at Bevenburg and moved through I Company with the lead elements on tanks. They secured the battalion's sector of Wuppertal without difficulty. That evening the battalion CP was set up in the southeast corner of Wuppertal and the 2nd Battalion of the 310th moved in to help control the city. All night the 3rd Battalion's positions were subjected to time fire from enemy artillery located on the other side of town. The Krauts were getting rid of the last of their ammunition. The fire could have been deadly but most of the shells were exploding so high in the air that they looked like flak-bursts and there was very little damage.

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
16 April 1945

By morning all artillery fire had ceased and the companies were waiting for new orders. There was a German department store down the street a few blocks from the battalion CP. It had been knocked open by shellfire and all day there were streams of liberated slave laborers moving noisily up and down the street. Going one way they were dressed in their ragged laborer's clothing but coming back they wore the sharpest in German suits and dresses. It was their big day, and the sudden release from oppression made them seem like little children on Christmas morning.

The battalion's riflemen were expecting to move on in and clean out the rest of the city but they waited till noon, and no order came. The hours went by, slowly,

Finally, just before dusk, the awaited word was received. But it was not an order to attack.

All the Germans had surrendered and the Ruhr Pocket was nonexistent. The job was done. The battalion mounted trucks and rode out of Wuppertal, moving south over battleground that was now peaceful German countryside. It was a warm spring evening and the quiet villages and sleeping fields were more like home than anything the GIs had seen since they crossed the German border on December 12th. The men riding the trucks that night were tired but they were able to really relax.

They may have had no idea of where they were going but they knew one thing for sure. There was no more combat within a hundred miles...

 
Day by Day in the Ruhr Pocket ...
Post Combat
 
At noon on the 16th of April in Wuppertal, the Third Battalion received orders to move to Gummersbach, where they were to be under 18th Corps (Airborne) control and assigned the mission of guarding the PW enclosure there. That afternoon the battalion traveled by truck to Gummersbach. They arrived there at 2300 and immediately assumed the duty of guarding the 60,000 prisoners. At 1120 on the 17th battalion received orders to be prepared to move to Dierdorf the following day. The new mission of the battalion was to guard communication lines and supply routes. They reverted to regimental control and on the 18th of April proceeded by motor to the vicinity of Dierdorf and were billeted in the town of Herchbach. Blue Battalion, in addition to accomplishing its security mission, instituted a training program which was in operation for three days when further orders altered the new program. They were to command a large area, part of which was then occupied by the 112th Infantry. On April 22nd the movements necessitated by these orders were completed and the battalion was attached to the 311th Infantry. Company M moved to Bonn, Company L to Konigswinter, Company K moved to Horhausen, and Company I remained with Headquarters in Herschbach.

The companies set up check points and maintained road patrols in their respective areas. The movements of all civilians and civilian vehicles were closely watched and numerous arrests were made for violations of security regulations.

On the 27th of April the battalion once again assembled at Herschbach, entrucked and departed for a new security mission in the vicinity of Frankenburg. Company M was not included in this move, having been ordered to remain in Bonn for another week.

Late afternoon on April 27th Battalion Headquarters was established in Fritzlar Germany a fair size town 18 miles south of Kassel. Headquarters Company and Company I were also billeted in Fritzlar. Company L was assigned to the town of Borken and Company K was located in the resort town of Bad Wildungen. Checkpoints and patrols were established and the battalion assumed responsibility for the security of a large area of Kreis Fritzlar Homberg. On the 29th two CIC teams reported to the battalion and plans were made to screen all the towns in the area. Company M was relieved in Bonn and returned to the battalion on the 3rd of May, and was billeted in Homberg. Training, screening and sundry operations continued until May 7th, during which time the battalion was responsible for the arrest and detention of many security violations and prisoners of war.

General Parker announced on May 7th that Germany had surrendered. The news was greeted calmly by all. The men paused briefly to think of all that had happened during the last six months and then applied themselves to the new tasks before them.

On the 8th 2030 a German plane landed near Wehren with 21 German soldiers and 1 civilian. Battalion Headquarters Company men captured the plane and its occupants and determined after questioning that the prisoners had escaped from Czechoslovakia and attempting to go to Cologne, along the Rhine River.

The war with Germany ended officially at 0001 on the 9th of May but it was necessary that training and security missions continue. The battalion observed V-E Day on the 13th with an appropriate ceremony. Lt. Col. Lutz, then acting Regimental Commander, delivered the principle address followed by Chaplain Voelzke and Mr. Robinson, the Regimental Red Cross Director. Music was furnished by a quintet from the Regimental Glee Club. On May 14th the battalion moved from FritzIar to the Kreis Waldeck area. Gen. Parker visited the area on May 20th and was present at a battalion review. Chaplain Voelzke officiated at the Memorial services held in Waldeck on the 30th of May.

The Third Battalion inaugurated a sports program with company teams in volleyball and softball organized into a battalion league. Battalion and Regimental field meets were held on successive Saturdays.

The first week in July Blue Battalion again changed their location, this time to Kreis Wolfhagen. L Company occupied Breitenbach, K Company, Martinhagen; M Company, Balhorn; I Company, Altenstadt; Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Ippinghausen. A full time training program was instituted to prepare the men for eventual participation in the fighting in the Pacific.

On Sept. 2nd World War 11 ended. The men of the Blue Battalion were able to completely relax once more. Happiness was in the hearts of all but it was sobered by the memory of all they had been through and by the memory of all their fallen comrades. Emphasis was now placed on occupation duties and eventual return to civilian life. Training time was cut down and a full I and E program and athletic program were carried out. A Battalion Newspaper was published weekly and the appearance of the men was improved with the issue of ETO jackets to all. Recreational